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 AN EARLY TRAGEDY OF  
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
FRANK GOODNOW AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 
Jedidiah Kroncke† 
Abstract: This article recovers a lost episode in the neglected early history of 
comparative constitutionalism in the United States.  In 1913, pioneering comparative 
lawyer Frank Goodnow went to China to assist the new Chinese Republic in the writing 
of its first constitution.  Goodnow’s mission reflected the growing interest of the United 
States in China’s legal development in this era, and his constitution-writing project won 
broad support from the U.S. legal profession.  Goodnow’s tenure ultimately generated 
great controversy when he advised China’s leaders to adopt a constitutional monarchy 
rather than continue on as a republic.  This article describes this controversy and how the 
international engagement of the United States was increasingly shaped in the early 
twentieth century by the attempted export of U.S. legal models as a presumptively 
altruistic mechanism of modernization.  Goodnow’s allegiance to comparative legal 
science agitated against this more parochial view of legal internationalism, and in the end 
he was excommunicated from U.S. foreign policy affairs. 
More broadly, this article shows how the early history of comparative 
constitutionalism in the United States had its roots in the early twentieth century 
discourse on colonial administration.  Goodnow and other U.S. lawyers of the era turned 
to indirect engagements with foreign legal reform only after the popular rejection of 
colonialism that had been constitutionally sanctioned by the now infamous Insular Cases.  
This article further argues that these colonial roots and Goodnow’s feckless misadventure 
in China hold key lessons for today’s comparative constitutionalists.  It provides a vivid 
example of how the technocratic illusion of engaging in depoliticized legal reform abroad 
is self-defeating and untenable.  Further, it warns against the inherent tensions between a 
methodologically coherent comparative law and the desire to export U.S. constitutional 
models abroad, and how such tensions can undercut clear-sighted understanding of 
foreign legal developments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, the American Political Science Association (“APSA”) 
inaugurated the first annual Frank Johnson Goodnow Award for distinguished 
service.1  The award was meant to “recognize distinguished service to the 
profession and the Association, not necessarily a career of scholarship.”2  This 
distinction between scholarship and service has to be considered with some 
irony, as Goodnow was not only a preeminent comparative lawyer, but also 
can be considered the founding figure in study of administrative law in the 
United States.3  Though Goodnow’s many institutional accomplishments were 
also significant, it is nevertheless true that his place in U.S. legal history is 
dim at best.  While history is replete with significant and novel thinkers 
whose work and influence are lost to the vagaries of time, unraveling 
Goodnow’s particular fate has little to do with his work on domestic U.S. law, 
but is instead tied to one of the earliest chapters in U.S. comparative 
constitutionalism.4 
This early chapter in U.S. comparative constitutionalism took place in 
the 1910s where many today might least expect it—China.  While Goodnow 
had risen in the ranks of Progressive legal scholars early in his career, he 
found himself at mid-career spending several years participating in a new and 
fervent U.S. interest in the new Chinese Republic formed in 1911.  In fact, in 
the opening decades of the early twentieth century, China had emerged as a 
key site within a newly emerging vision of U.S. law’s international influence.  
Rejecting the colonial impulses regnant in the expansionist wave of the late 
1890s and the Supreme Court’s pro-colonialism decisions in the infamous 
Insular Cases, the United States instead embraced new forms of ostensibly 
consensual engagement with foreign legal development—the groundwork of 
what today would be called “law and development.”5  Goodnow was one of a 
                                           
1
 Goodnow’s service to APSA as an organization was significant; he was the organization’s first 
president in 1903.  Frederic A. Ogg, Frank Johnson Goodnow, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1940). 
2
  Id. 
3
 See Eliza Wing-Yee Lee, Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American 
Administrative State, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 539 (1995); Laurence Lynn, Restoring the Rule of Law to 
Public Administration, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 803 (2009). 
4
 The interest in comparative constitutionalism in America has been growing over the past two 
decades.  See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771. (1997); 
Sujit Choudry, Globalization in Search of Justification, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The 
Value of Comparative Perspective in Judicial Decision-Making, 74 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 213 (2005); Vicki 
Jackson, Constitutional Comparison, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1998).  
5
  See Brian Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 44 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 209 (2011); David Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 4 WIS. L. 
REV. 1062 (1974). 
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generation of legal scholars who had first imagined their international careers 
as colonial administrators, but who suddenly found themselves running 
reform projects alongside sovereign foreign governments, under both private 
and public aegis.  Amid this sea change, Goodnow turned his gaze from 
reforming the United States’ constitution to reshaping China’s. 
The turn of the twentieth century was a turbulent time for U.S. society, 
and the opening decade of the twentieth century was transformative for the 
U.S. legal profession.  Many of the great works of U.S. legal history have 
grappled with the wide-ranging effects that industrialization, urbanization, 
immigration, and a host of other social developments wrought for U.S. 
lawyers.6  These developments eventually reshaped not only the basic ways in 
which U.S. lawyers were educated and trained, but also the scope of their 
participation in this era of rapid legal and political transformation in the U.S.7 
While the domestic stories of these transformations have been well 
studied, the international dimensions of these changes have only recently 
become the subject of serious inquiry.  As Goodnow’s story reveals, U.S. 
lawyers played a key role in the early internationalization of U.S. society, and 
a role that more often than not intertwined with the increasing prominence of 
lawyers domestically.  The demise of Goodnow’s career as a leading member 
of this new U.S. international legal elite illustrates the shifts that the U.S. 
legal community was undergoing in its orientation to foreign legal systems at 
this time. 
The fusion of new ideas about legal science and the professionalization 
of U.S. law had cascading effects across the United States.  In the 
international arena, these changes helped produce the image of the U.S. 
lawyer as a foreign reformer who was working to bring the advancements of 
U.S. law to the rest of the world.  This noble image unified U.S. lawyers 
across the political and legal spectrum.8  Concurrently, the idea that U.S. law 
could bring the influence of putatively its greatest achievement—the 
Constitution—to foreign nations garnered broad appeal.9  Yet, this idea of 
                                           
6
 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in American Law, 1870-1960 (1992); James 
W. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (1950). 
7
  See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
8
  Jedidiah Kroncke, Law & Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
9
  THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 160 (1999) (noting 
that “[t]he image of an American constitutional scholar heading off to foreign lands with copies of the U.S. 
Constitution in his or her briefcase, to help constitutionally underdeveloped foreigners, is somehow a 
familiar one”); see also Paul Carrington, Writing Other People’s Constitutions, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 167 (2007).  For an overview of the mid-twentieth century decline of American comparative 
constitutionalism, see David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar 
Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 17 (2011). 
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export was still grounded in many of the same evolutionary and paternalistic 
assumptions that had structured the U.S. legal community’s now often 
forgotten focus on colonial administration during the late 1890s and early 
1900s. 
Moreover, the idea of the United States as an aggressive exporter of 
legal knowledge and institutions abroad was vigorously contested in the early 
twentieth century as the nation gradually emerged from its ninteenth-century 
status as a neophyte in international legal affairs.  At this time, the popularity 
of comparative methods was at an all-time high in U.S. law, as many legal 
scholars embraced a vibrant transatlantic exchange of legal knowledge and 
ideas.10  While the rise and decline of the transatlantic dimensions of this 
exchange has been chronicled before,11 scholarship to date has overlooked the 
fact that comparativists such as Goodnow were being simultaneously drawn 
to efforts to reshape the legal systems of non-Western nations such as China.  
Recapturing this development is crucial, as after World War II such export 
efforts would serve as the blueprint for U.S. law’s relationship to Western and 
non-Western foreign legal systems alike.  Just like Goodnow himself, U.S. 
law slowly traded legal comparativism for the export of U.S. legal institutions 
and ideas in the international legal arena.12 
 However, instead of serving as an exemplar of this new turn, 
Goodnow’s mission to write the Chinese constitution did not inaugurate a 
grand beginning to U.S. comparative constitutionalism, but instead was 
deemed a great and notorious failure.  Goodnow’s actual impact on Chinese 
constitutional development was ephemeral and he ultimately became 
associated with an attempt to transform the Chinese Republic into a 
constitutional monarchy.13  Ironically, Goodnow’s deep commitment to 
comparative legal science helped to facilitate this failure and placed him 
deeply at odds with the U.S. legal elite who had sponsored his trip.  
Goodnow’s unwavering belief that his expertise could generate depoliticized 
legal solutions to contentious Chinese problems inevitably rendered his 
attempt to influence Chinese constitutionalism ineffective.  Yet, this faith also 
led him to believe that constitutional monarchy was objectively best suited for 
China, an idea that conflicted with the emerging notion that 
                                           
10
  Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David S. Clark, The Modern 
Development of Comparative Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (2007). 
11
  The classic work on the transatlantic exchange of this era is DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC 
CROSSINGS (1998). 
12
  See Kroncke, supra note 8. 
13
  See infra Part IV. 
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“Americanization” was the inherent goal of U.S. participation in foreign legal 
reform. 
As a result, following Goodnow’s return from China, he was effectively 
excommunicated from international affairs.  His excommunication exposed 
the fact that U.S. law had begun to dramatically shift away from comparative 
law as an intellectual enterprise for domestic consumption to an export-
oriented view of international engagement.  Further, his excommunication 
exposed how both stateside defenses and criticisms of Goodnow’s work 
served to warp U.S. perceptions of foreign legal development that were 
premised on the shared assumption that the U.S. could and should influence 
the direction of Chinese legal development. 
Quite directly then, this early episode of failed comparative 
constitutionalism contains crucial lessons and questions for today’s new wave 
of comparative constitutions.  It forcefully presents basic questions about the 
very nature of their enterprise and what ends such work ultimately serves. 
To elucidate these claims and present the details of Goodnow’s life as 
a comparative constitutionalist, this article proceeds in three parts.  Part II 
outlines Goodnow’s rise to prominence in Progressive legal circles as a 
comparative legal scholar and discusses the significance of his appointment 
as constitutional adviser to China in this early era of the internationalization 
of U.S. law.  Part III details Goodnow’s actual tenure as adviser and analyzes 
the root causes of both his failure to influence Chinese constitutionalism and 
his attempts to shape U.S. perceptions of Chinese legal development.  Part 
IV shows how Goodnow’s endorsement of constitutional monarchy for 
China received a mixed but ultimately negative response in the United 
States, while also illustrating how his belief in depoliticized legal expertise 
led him to be manipulated by China’s failed monarchist, Yuan Shikai.  The 
article concludes by arguing that Goodnow’s failure as a comparativist is 
more than just a minor historical chapter in an important transitional period 
in the legal history, but rather presents a set of probative lessons for today’s 
newly emerging and enthusiastic comparative constitutionalists. 
II. FRANK GOODNOW AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
It is fitting to begin with the fact that there is no official biography of 
Frank Goodnow.  Given his prominence as a leading intellectual and 
institutional actor of his day, this omission is instantly telling.  At the same 
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time, his fame in his day makes the general outline of his life easy to 
recover.14 
 
A. The Making of a Comparative Legal Star 
Frank Johnson Goodnow was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1859.  
The son of a successful entrepreneur, his career developed as a product of his 
personal passions, as he never required income from regular employment.  He 
graduated from Amherst College in 1879 and subsequently moved to 
Columbia University, where he earned his L.L.B. in 1882.  After a brief stint 
in a law office, he was offered the opportunity to teach administrative law at 
Columbia.  Indicative of the cosmopolitanism of the era, he was given this 
opportunity with the condition that he travel to Europe for further study.  As 
such, before beginning at Columbia in 1884, he studied at the Ecole Libre des 
Sciences Politiques in France and the University of Berlin in Germany.15 
Goodnow’s early career reflected the shifting terrain of U.S. legal study 
and education.  While he had received post-graduate training in law, his 
appointment at Columbia was in the recently-established political science 
department, not in a dedicated law school.  Furthermore, before he became a 
full professor, he completed a separate doctorate in political science beyond 
his L.L.B.  He was resistant to the then-nascent Langdellian revolution in 
legal education that sought to segregate the university study of law based on a 
professional post-graduate model, although he would eventually hold a joint 
appointment with Columbia’s law school.16 
Goodnow’s early focus was on administrative law.  He was among the 
early pioneers whose work in this field was largely ignored by law schools, 
who viewed administrative law as in tension with the common law tradition.17  
Goodnow’s first major publication came in 1886, titled The Executive and the 
Courts.18  In this article, he presaged one of the emerging issues of 
governance that would come to define debates over administrative law in the 
U.S.:  the tension between a juridical rule of law and the authority of 
scientific expertise.19 
                                           
14
  Biographical information on Frank Goodnow is derived from various sources present in the 
archives at Johns Hopkins University.  FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW PAPERS MS. 3 (Special Collection, 
Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University) [hereinafter GOODNOW PAPERS]. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
  See Christopher Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 145 (1887); Marcia 
Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
18
  Frank J. Goodnow, The Executive and the Courts, 1 POL. SCI. Q. 533 (1886). 
19
  See Lynn, supra note 3. 
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Goodnow’s 1893 publication, Comparative Administrative Law, 
catapulted him into the firmament of Progressive-era thought.20  At the time 
of its publication, this work was by far the most systematic treatment of 
administrative law as a coherent subject of scholarly inquiry ever produced, 
and it remains a monument of comparative legal analysis.  He drew on a wide 
range of sources to compare the rising U.S. administrative state with those of 
France, England, and Germany.  Emblematic of his broad general 
methodological gaze, the scope of his empirical references included Prussia, 
Holland, and, significantly, the separate legal traditions of individual U.S. 
states.  He delved deeply into not only theory but also the function of 
administrative law within these distinct legal systems, and avoided the 
seductive pitfall of comparative textualism.  While he saw that all societies 
faced common challenges in governance, he understood that each legal 
system not only attempted to solve pragmatic problems but did so through 
solutions that aspired to express very different political values. 
Essential to understanding Goodnow’s comparative work was that he 
saw himself as a participant in the trans-Atlantic intellectual world.  Many 
have cited the early twentieth century as the great flowering of comparative 
law when foreign legal ideas had a wide-ranging impact on U.S. law.21  It was 
indeed a time when U.S. reformers felt free to use European examples as the 
basis for U.S. legal reforms.22  Thus, at this time comparative law was not 
solely the isolated study of foreign legal systems by specialized scholars, but 
was seen as a broader commitment to comparative methods throughout legal 
scholarship that aimed to produce actionable knowledge for domestic 
reform.23 
 Moreover, Goodnow’s comparative work showed no parochial 
favoritism, and he was dispassionate in his analysis of what he saw as the 
flaws of U.S. law.  He truly believed in a universal social science, one to 
which no existing assumption or institution was sacrosanct or beyond 
analysis.  Goodnow also possessed the characteristic Progressive belief in the 
potential for social progress to be promoted through the application of expert 
knowledge, and he firmly believed that his scientific work was in the public 
                                           
20
  FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1893). 
21
  See John F. Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of American Civil 
Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 710 n 15 (2004). 
22
  See RODGERS, supra note 11; Kennedy, supra note 10. 
23
  See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION 4 (1886) (Stating that “[w]hy 
should we not use such parts of foreign contrivances as we want, if they be in any way serviceable?  We are 
in no danger of using them in a foreign way.  We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chopsticks.”). 
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interest.24  In sum, he made it very clear that the study of law should be, like 
all legal analysis, part of an inherently comparative science.25  In this respect, 
Goodnow should be considered a founding scholar of modern U.S. 
comparative law.26 
The strength of Goodnow’s commitment to comparative law led him 
into controversial territory in his day, as his vigorous critique of existing U.S. 
legal and political institutions rankled more conservative sensibilities.  Yet, 
the social tumult of his era was one in which active political engagement 
could be coupled with the contemplation of quite significant deviations from 
what was then considered to be the traditional Anglo-American legal heritage 
of the United States.  In his 1899 review of Henry Jones Ford’s The Rise and 
Growth of American Politics, Goodnow praised the unwritten 
constitutionalism of England and claimed that England’s recent innovations in 
governance were due to the comparative advantage they enjoyed from not 
being bound by “a written constitution not susceptible of easy amendment.”27  
Goodnow would again express a deep critique of U.S. institutions in his 
1900 treatise Politics and Administration.28  There he claimed that U.S. 
governance was captured by party politics rather than by popular will; with an 
irony soon to be revealed, he criticized the power politics of party leaders 
using the villainous archetype of “the Boss.”29  He repeatedly invoked a need 
to critically emulate England,30 and drew examples from many nations, 
including a call for the adoption of Australian balloting procedures.31 
A few years later, Goodnow would publish another book wherein he 
critiqued the notion that the Anglo-American legal tradition rejected his own 
reform agenda as foreign and unwelcome.32  He claimed that such a discourse 
                                           
24
 See LISA ANDERSON, PURSUING TRUTH, EXERCISING POWER: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, 1 (1967) 
(describing the “new scientific gospel”). 
25
  GOODNOW, supra note 20, at iv (stating that “this knowledge can be obtained only by study, and 
by comparison of our own with foreign administrative models”). 
26
  Fellow hybrid law professor-political scientist Thomas Reed Powell commented on Comparative 
Administrative Law after Goodnow’s passing, saying “[b]y means of this survey he was enabled to set the 
stakes for the field of American administrative law and to work out the boundaries within which a distinct 
branch of legal science was to develop.”  Ogg, supra note 1, at 116. 
27
  Frank J. Goodnow, Book Review, 14 POL. SCI. Q. 156 (1899). 
28
  FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 198 (1900). 
29
  Id. (stating “the political storm centre in the U.S. is therefore not in the government, but in the 
party”). 
30
 “Let us follow her examples, not so much in attempting any exact imitation of what she has done, 
as in adopting her frame of mind and in evincing the same willingness which she has shown, to adapt her 
governmental system to changed conditions.”  Id. at 263. 
31
  Id. at 241-42. 
32
  FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1905). 
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elided the functional purpose of law in favor of an atavistic worship of the 
past as success and failure were found everywhere in the human world.33 
During this era, the ascendency of Progressive legal thought was far 
from universal or uncritically accepted, but Goodnow’s perspective was 
becoming the norm among a range of U.S. elites who were emboldened by a 
kindred sense of scientific possibility, if not always-careful erudition. 
 
B. The Early Twentieth Century Internationalization of U.S. Law 
Goodnow’s deep critiques of U.S. law were developed during a time 
when U.S. lawyers were at the center of vibrant arguments over the proper 
shape of the United States’ increasingly prominent role in international 
relations.  Prior to the early twentieth century, the often grand rhetorical 
statements about the exceptional nature of U.S. law had been tightly 
constrained by the United States’ practical status as a fledging postcolonial 
nation.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, U.S. lawyers had been 
more interested in gaining a sense of parity and respect in the arena of 
international law than popular rhetorical assertions concerning the United 
States’s exceptional legal character might otherwise misleadingly represent.34  
While U.S. lawyers had long trumpeted U.S. law in foreign contexts, 
especially the achievement of the United States Constitution,35 it was not until 
the turn of the twentieth century that the United States as a nation was able to 
confidently assert its exceptional legal character in the form of an active 
foreign policy overseas.36 
Basic questions about the shape of modern U.S. internationalism were 
placed center stage during the 1890s in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War and the acquisition of foreign territories outside of the United 
States’ continental bounds.37  Americans fiercely debated whether the U.S. 
republican tradition was compatible with forms of European colonial empire 
                                           
33
  Id. 
34
  See Daniel J. Hulsebosch & David M. Golove, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 
(2010). 
35
  See GEORGE A. BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989 
(2009). 
36
  Scholars of American foreign policy have long noted that idealized versions of American history 
are normatively structured and are offered as carrying implied lessons for foreign nations.  See RUSSELL L. 
HANSON, THE DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATION IN AMERICA: CONVERSATIONS WITH OUR PAST 424 (1985); 
WALTER L. HIXSON, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 8 (2008). 
37
  See SALLY MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII (1999); ARTHUR POWER DUDDEN, THE AMERICAN 
PACIFIC (1992); EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (2001); EDIBERTO 
ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES (2006).  
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from which many had long tried to distance the country.38  These debates 
were resolved constitutionally in the Insular Cases, a series of hotly contested 
decisions whereby the Supreme Court legitimated the acquisition of colonial 
territories.39  In fact, one of the often forgotten aspects of this era was how 
strong the support for colonialism was among U.S. lawyers.40 
However, the United States did not take the path of colonial empire 
following the Spanish-American War.  Instead, the outcome of the political 
contest over the issues of colonialism left U.S. foreign policy primarily 
embracing other forms of indirect and consensual engagement with foreign 
legal systems.  While many, like Goodnow, had seen the compatibility of 
legal science with forms of colonial administration, they had to adapt quickly 
to foreign legal reform work predicated on a very different form of 
engagement, one dictated by the eventual victors in the political battle over 
expansionism.  These victors, generally associated with Woodrow Wilson’s 
presidential administration, favored a view of indirect, yet still eminently 
paternalistic, foreign engagement that overtly eschewed colonialism.41 
Thus, while many early internationalists had focused their energies on 
developing colonial administrations for the newly acquired U.S. territories, 
the U.S. government and a swath of private organizations began to fund 
efforts to shape foreign legal development fully divorced from the usurpation 
of local sovereignty.42  From the outset, such work was cloaked with language 
intended to differentiate the U.S. lawyer abroad from his colonial European, 
especially British, counterpart.43  Historian Paul Carrington has cataloged 
many of these early efforts, capturing how legal reform projects became tied 
                                           
38
 See AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE 7 (2005); Roger 
Bresnahan, Islands in Our Minds, in REFLECTION ON ORIENTALISM 57 (Warren Cohen ed., 1983); see 
generally, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY (Abraham Lowenthal ed., 1991).  For the formal policy against 
colonial language in the Philippines, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS 
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE ch. 6 (2010); STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE (1989). 
39
 Most of these new territories had various “Organic Acts” which provided a constitutional 
infrastructure.  Citizens in these territories resurrected old constitutional questions about the rights of 
foreign citizens under American jurisdiction abroad.  See Ross v. United States, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); see 
generally JAMES KERR, THE INSULAR CASES (1982); BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006). 
40
 See, e.g., Simeon Baldwin, The Historic Policy of the US as to Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 390 
(1894); John Burgess, How May the U.S. Govern its Extra-Continental Territory?, 14 POL. SCI. Q. 1 
(1899); Christopher Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1898); James 
Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1898); Carman Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of 
Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898).  
41
  DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 38. 
42
 See generally Kroncke, supra note 8. 
43
 Legal reform was an original British justification for colonialism.  See HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR 
JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND (1985); MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL 
ORDER (1985); NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, THE SCANDAL OF EMPIRE (2006); BERNARD PORTER, EMPIRE AND 
SUPEREMPIRE (2006). 
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to the growing presence of U.S. lawyers across the globe.44  Furthermore, this 
era witnessed the near domination of U.S. foreign policy by lawyers who, 
while often divided on issues of international law, shared a common belief in 
the role of U.S. lawyers as foreign reformers.45 
The rapid proliferation of U.S. engagements with foreign legal reform 
at this time was intrinsically tied to the main idea that animated Goodnow’s 
work:  that law was best understood as a scientific enterprise.  Often linked at 
this time to popular theories of legal evolution,46 many U.S. lawyers 
expressed great confidence that not only could law be used instrumentally to 
effect social change at home, but that the universality of legal science could 
achieve the same ends abroad.  These new instrumentalist views of law used 
the presumption of scientific validity to argue that legal development was best 
considered the province of legal expertise rather than of political deliberation 
and process.47  
The notion of law as legal science had profound effects on U.S. law and 
transformed the U.S. legal profession at the turn of the twentieth century.48  
The authority and legitimacy of law as a distinct science led to fundamental 
changes in U.S. legal education,49 the development of modern bar 
associations,50 and nationalized legal practice.51  Yet still, no aspect of U.S. 
law was seen as more central than its Constitution.52 
                                           
44
  PAUL CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD 1 (2005) (describing those who have “striven 
to make the governments and laws of other peoples more like their own”). 
45
  Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the 
New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 (2003) [hereinafter Gilded Age]; Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping 
of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583 (2004) [hereinafter Twenty 
Years’ Crisis]. 
46
 See, e.g., LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (1877); BROOK ADAMS, THE LAW OF 
CIVILIZATION AND DECAY (1896); see also Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 485 (2009). 
47
   See ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1 (1967) (describing the “new scientific gospel”); 
see also Anderson, supra note 24. 
48
  See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 43-44 (1989); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 526 (2005). 
49
  See generally WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1994); Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of Natural Sciences in 
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1999). 
50
  Edward Gee & Donald Jackson, American Legal Education and the Bar: Hand in Hand or Fist in 
Glove?, 4 LEARNING & L. 34 (1977); Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 36 (1983); 
Harry Frist, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (1978). 
51
  See William Novak, The Legal Origins of the American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S 
CENTURY 267 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth, & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002).  The nationalization of legal 
practice centered in urban, corporate law firms nevertheless coexisted with the continued fragmentation and 
localization of American law inherent in the American commitment to federalism.  See ALISON LACROIX, 
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010). 
52
  See Carrington, supra note 9. 
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The sum force of these shifts was the emergence of a new popular 
image of “American lawyers” and of the institutions that produced them.  
Even though many of these developments in U.S. law were hotly contested at 
the time,53 the allure of law as an apolitical exertion of expertise eventually 
consumed the profession.54  While there was, and still is, a great deal of 
underlying diversity in U.S. legal practice, a newly standardized template 
could be offered up abroad as to what constituted the prototypical U.S. 
lawyer.   
C. From Colonial Administrator to Comparative Constitutionalist 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, Goodnow’s star 
continued to steadily rise.55  It was at this time that his relationship with 
Woodrow Wilson and other leading legal scholars garnered him the first 
presidency of APSA, then a leading center for the study of international and 
comparative law.  At the same time, he founded the Internationale de Droit 
Public.  In 1906, he was named Dean of the Political Science Department at 
Columbia and was selected as a member of a range of increasingly influential 
academic societies.  His influence outside of academia also expanded rapidly.  
He became the first Chairman of the Institute of Governmental Research 
(later the Brookings Institute), and he was invited to serve on the boards of 
other such “think tanks.”  He traveled to England for the National Civic 
Federation’s Commission on Public Ownership, and in 1911 he was recruited 
by President Taft to serve on his Commission on Efficiency and Economy. 
Goodnow’s success as a public and private institutional actor did not 
dull his scholarly activity.  Turning from his early focus on administrative law, 
he came to increasingly focus on constitutional reform.  In 1911, he published 
Social Reform and the Constitution, in which he directly singled out the U.S. 
Constitution as a relic that hindered social progress.56  Furthermore, Goodnow 
claimed that the Bill of Rights was emblematic of this anachronistic state, as 
                                           
53
  See generally WILLIAM JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF 
PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 177 (1978). 
54
  MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 256 (1977) (arguing that 
“the desire to separate law and politics has always been a central aspiration of the American legal 
profession”); see also Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).  
55
  As mentioned above, biographical information about Frank Goodnow comes from primary source 
materials located in the archives of Johns Hopkins University.  GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14. 
56
  FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION v (1911) (asserting that the 
purpose of the work is “to ascertain . . . to what extent the Constitution of the United States in its present 
form is a bar to the adoption of the most important social reform measures which have been made parts of 
the reform program of the most progressive peoples of the present day”). 
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it was created for “eighteenth-century conditions, and has therefore no regard 
for existing social needs.”57 
Goodnow also made clear in Social Reform and the Constitution his 
deep concern that the traditional structure of U.S. federalism was out of step 
with social reality:  “the experience of the civilized world since our 
constitution was adopted is opposed to a system of federal government which 
fixes unalterably in accordance with some political theory of universal 
application the jurisdiction of national and state governments.”58  Leaving no 
sacred ground unprofaned, Goodnow ended the book with a spirited critique 
of judicial review in much the anti-Lochnerite fashion of the day.59  This won 
him few new supporters in the emerging professional legal academy, but it 
increased his esteem among the new Wilsonian establishment.60   
Critically, Goodnow renewed his emphasis on a cosmopolitan 
comparativism, and he placed parochialism and civilizational development 
squarely at odds.  He rejected most of his critics as being inherently anti-
scientific:   
For one reason or another the people of the United States came 
soon to regard with an almost superstitious reverence the 
document into which this general scheme of government was 
incorporated, and many considered, and even now consider, that 
scheme, as they conceive it, to be the last word which can be 
said as to the proper form of government—a form believed to 
be suited to all times and conditions.61 
Overlooked in previous studies, Goodnow’s interest in domestic 
constitutional reform was at the same time comingled with a deep, decade-
long interest in the study of colonial administration.62  Like the host of U.S. 
                                           
57
  Id. at 17. 
58
  Id. at 13. 
59
  For a revisionist update on the politics of Lochner, see DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING 
LOCHNER (2011). 
60
  The standard accounts of Goodnow’s scholarship instead usually emphasize his work on 
municipal governance as the new ground he broke during this early decade.  See AXEL SCHAFER, 
AMERICAN PROGRESSIVES AND GERMAN SOCIAL REFORM 98 (2000). 
61
  GOODNOW, supra note 56, at 9-10.  Thus, he concluded that the rise of the administrative state was 
a scientific inevitability given a rational approach to legal development—and that dissent would only retard 
America’s participation in the “orderly and progressive development, which we regard as characteristic of 
modern civilization.”  Id. at 359. 
62
  Schmidt makes passing reference to Goodnow in his study of Paul Reinsch’s career, as a leading 
Progressive scholar-lawyer and colonial administrator, noting that Goodnow was critical of Reinsch’s 1905 
work COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION.  See Brian Schmidt, Paul S. Reinsch & the Study of Imperialism and 
Internationalism, in IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 63 (David Long & Brian Schmidt eds., 2005). 
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reformers across the political spectrum who had leapt to undertake reform in 
the United States’ post-1898 territories, Goodnow had become entranced by 
the notion that his scientific expertise could not only regenerate the United 
States, but also foreign legal systems.  In unambiguous terms, Goodnow’s 
early interest presumed that America was to become a colonial power 
following the constitutional basis for empire established in the Insular Cases.  
Inherent in this position was Goodnow’s adoption of strong evolutionary 
presumptions that helped mediate the tensions between his comparativism and 
his universalism.63 
In fact, following the larger relationship between Progressive thought 
and U.S. colonial administration, Goodnow appears to have spent the majority 
of the decade prior to his appointment in China applying his general methods 
and insights outside of the United States.64  Between 1902 and 1909, 
Goodnow lectured widely on colonial administration and traveled to a number 
of U.S. territories.  He corresponded with an array of colonial officials 
including Samuel Gromer, then Treasurer of Puerto Rico.  Many of his early 
interactions with other members of the American Political Science 
Association, such as Westel Willoughby and Woodrow Wilson himself, were 
in dialogue over their various roles in colonial administration.65 
It is likely that Goodnow’s deep interest in colonial administration has 
remained overlooked due to the fact that none of his own works on the subject 
were ever published.  In fact, the only available copies of his writings on 
colonial administration are stored in his personal archive at Johns Hopkins 
University, and even today there is no extant scholarly reference to these 
writings.  Nevertheless, the quantity of material Goodnow produced in this 
vein is quite significant.  He wrote two papers on U.S. dependencies that 
survive today, The U.S. System of Governing Dependencies66 and Governing 
Dependencies:  The Philippines.67  These articles are characteristic of 
Goodnow’s broader research in that they draw on a comparative analysis of 
                                           
63
  “[I]t is believed that the real political institutions of different peoples at the same stage of 
intelligence and morality will show a great similarity, even where the external forms of government appear 
very different.  This similarity is due . . . to the fact that after all man is man everywhere at all times, and 
that all political organizations of men must therefore have ultimately the same ends, and must adopt in a 
general way the same methods for their satisfaction.”  GOODNOW, supra note 28, at 7. 
64
  Goodnow is listed by Anderson as a key example of the transnational mutualism of Progressive-
era reform work.  ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 19-20. 
65
  Personal correspondence of Frank J. Goodnow.  See GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 14. 
66
  Frank J. Goodnow, The U.S. System of Governing Dependencies, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra note 
14. 
67
  Frank J. Goodnow, Governing Dependencies: The Philippines, GOODNOW PAPERS,  
supra note 14. 
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the various “American dependencies” while outlining the way in which new 
territory was acquired under the Insular Cases.   
Even more striking, however, is the fact that Goodnow had prepared a 
massive treatise titled “History and Principles of Colonial Administration.”68  
This work incorporated the lectures that he had given in the prior decade and 
covered the colonial experience of every major European power.  The scope 
of Goodnow’s analysis was broadly historical and included an analysis of the 
settlement of the U.S. colonies and the earliest English colonial experiences in 
Africa and India.  It is here that he made clear the evolutionary context of his 
worldview, establishing a clear bridge between the civilizing legitimation of 
European colonialism and the U.S. administration of its dependencies.69  
More generally, it was in the colonial context that he first contemplated the 
wholesale re-creation of a constitutional order and began to draw on his 
comparative constitutional work to imagine shaping foreign legal 
development abroad. 
In these writings, Goodnow placed the science of administration, both 
domestic and foreign, as beyond morality.  Colonialism, for him, was just 
another social process that should be analyzed scientifically outside of moral 
judgment.  He was most critical of Dutch colonialism because he believed 
that it was far too unscientific in its attempt to assimilate too quickly what he 
saw as a culturally backwards people to European norms of law and 
governance.70 
Goodnow’s colonial writings place his invitation to serve as a legal 
adviser in China in an entirely new context.  It was not solely his intellectual 
stature or personal associations that led to his appointment.  Instead, by 1912 
Goodnow was set to become a leading expert on colonial administration.  As 
U.S. law turned increasingly away from colonialism and towards the more 
indirect, presumptively acolonial, methods of engagement abroad, the 
colonial thought of the era, Goodnow’s included, was largely swept under the 
proverbial intellectual rug. 
 
                                           
68
  Frank Goodnow, History and Principles of Colonial Administration, GOODNOW PAPERS, supra 
note 14. 
69
  Of note, in this entire manuscript only one reference to China can be found:  “If they have 
obtained a high degree of civilization, they will be enabled to wage war successfully against the invaders.  
If their civilization is not so high, the mere fact that they are adapted to the existing conditions, will enable 
them to labor so much more cheaply than the invaders, that no great laboring population will be imported 
into the colony.”  The citation referencing China does not appear directly in the text, but simply as a hand-
written side-note in the left-hand column, “China.”  Id. 
70
  While many of Goodnow’s exemplary methodological qualities as a comparativist are on display in 
his writings on colonial administration, he never gives equal weight to the conditions and traditions in 
colonial territories—only the European and American practices are noted. 
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D. The Carnegie Endowment and Writing China’s Constitution 
As great as interest in Chinese legal development has been in recent 
years,71 it is almost completely forgotten that China was at the center of U.S. 
internationalism during the early twentieth century.72  It was a time when the 
new U.S. confidence of the era coincided with the increasingly dire political 
instability plaguing China.  For decades, the Qing Dynasty in China had been 
wracked by international and domestic turmoil and it began to fully collapse 
in 1911.  Inspired by an unplanned revolt in China’s Hebei province, local 
leaders throughout China declared their independence from the Qing and 
began calling for a Chinese Republic in what has been called the Xinhai 
Revolution.  Suddenly, expatriate Chinese intellectual Sun Yat-Sen was 
thrown into the U.S. spotlight as the presumptive leader of what many 
thought would be an U.S.-inspired regime.  Even though China was in fact 
tangential to U.S. economic and military interests in 1911,73 Americans 
became fascinated by the prospect that China was committed to emulating the 
United States.  
China’s potential “Americanization” so entranced Americans primarily 
due to the influence of the U.S. missionary movement.  The U.S. missionary 
movement that grew out of the late ninteenth-century U.S. religious revival 
quickly became the United States’ first organized institutional presence 
abroad.74  It secured its presence and broad popularity through a well-
organized public relations infrastructure, and as the United States became 
increasingly involved in international affairs at the turn of the twentieth 
century, it was missionaries who shaped U.S. views of the world outside of 
Europe.75  Nowhere had the missionary influence on U.S. life been more 
manifest than in its great focus on China, which had long been the centerpiece 
of U.S. missionary prestige and fundraising campaigns.76  
Moreover, the U.S. missionary leadership served as a crucial vanguard 
for popularizing the idea of indirect, non-colonial Americanization of foreign 
countries.  The long-standing missionary vision of transplanting U.S. 
                                           
71
  See generally STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 
(2000); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002). 
72
  See MICHEL HUNT, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (1983); CAROLA MCGIFFERT, CHINA IN THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION (2003). 
73
  HUGH DEANE, GOOD DEEDS & GUNBOATS: TWO CENTURIES OF AMERICAN-CHINESE ENCOUNTERS 
38-39 (1990). 
74
  See generally WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, REVIVALS, AWAKENINGS AND REFORM (1978). 
75
  See, e.g., CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA (Daniel H. Bays ed., 1996); see also THE MISSIONARY 
ENTERPRISE IN CHINA AND AMERICA (John Fairbank ed., 1974); JAMES REED, THE MISSIONARY MIND AND 
AMERICAN EAST ASIAN POLICY (1983). 
76
  See KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN CHINA (1929). 
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institutions abroad to stimulate democratic and capitalist development 
appealed to both the non-interventionist and humanitarian veins in U.S. 
politics.77  Particular to law, U.S. missionaries, often trained in both law and 
theology,78 had long argued for the catalytic power of transplanting U.S. legal 
institutions abroad.79 
Thus, the christening of China as a republic drew the attention of U.S. 
lawyers who carried forth this missionary spirit as they sought to demonstrate 
U.S. law’s ability to spur liberalization and economic development abroad.80  
Consequently, many lawyers focused on advancing Sino-U.S. relations as the 
best example for showcasing the United States’ new humanitarian legal 
internationalism.81  
Yet, for all the fanfare that the new Chinese Republic received in the 
United States, in reality, Chinese politics suffered from deep regional 
fragmentation.82  Sun Yat-Sen and his revolutionary supporters, organized as 
the Guomindang Party (“GMD”), were primarily situated in southern China.  
Standing in the north, and still commanding China’s only modern army, was 
General Yuan Shikai and the remnants of the Qing regime.  Within a year, the 
new government agreed to replace Sun Yat-Sen with Yuan as the President of 
the Republic.83  The weakness of the nominally unified government led to an 
ongoing period of great instability.84 
As a result of this instability, the Taft administration was initially 
hesitant to recognize the new Republic, and most European nations saw the 
new regime as too unstable.85  However, expressions of sympathy in the 
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  See Kroncke, supra note 8. 
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  See, e.g., RALPH R. COVELL, W.A.P. MARTIN: PIONEER OF PROGRESS IN CHINA (1978). 
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  For an earlier American effort to shape Chinese legal education by Harvard law professor Warren 
Seavey, see DONALD KING, A HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR 17 (2005).  Contemporaneous with 
Goodnow there were efforts to export American legal education and bar associations to China.  See Alison 
Conner, The Comparative Law School of China, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 235 
(Stephen Hsu ed., 2004); Xu Xiaoqun, Between State and Society, Between Professionalism and Politics: 
The Shanghai Bar Association in Republican China, 24 TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA 1 (1998).  On the 
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legal development.  See Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217; 
EILEEN SCULLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM AFAR (2001). 
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  Part of the treaty signed after the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the twentieth century involved 
American support for Chinese legal reform.  MCGIFFERT, supra note 72, at 33. 
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  JERRY ISRAEL, PROGRESSIVISM AND THE OPEN DOOR 91 (1971). 
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  See, e.g., Frederic McCormick, Present Conditions in China, 22 NAT’L. GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 1120 
(1911). 
83
  See generally STEPHEN MACKINNON, POWER & POLITICS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1980).  For a 
critical view of Chinese politics from the era, see STEPHEN KING-HALL, WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND THE 
FAR EAST (1924). 
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  MACKINNON, supra note 83. 
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  See Meribeth Cameron, American Recognition Policy toward the Republic of China, 2 PAC. HIST. 
REV. 214, 214-30 (1933); Clarence Davis, Financing Imperialism, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 236 (1983). 
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United States for the Chinese Revolution became far less complicated once 
Woodrow Wilson was elected President in 1912.86  Wilson rejected Taft’s 
more conservative diplomatic strategy towards China and withdrew the 
United States from the international banking consortium which had been 
leveraging loans for political influence.  He then quickly and unilaterally 
granted recognition to the Chinese Republic.87  Here, Wilson’s moves again 
reflected the deep influence that religious and missionary thought had upon 
his views of law and foreign affairs.88 
Wilson was explicit in his view that the United States was neither an 
empire nor a colonial power, and he saw the U.S. opportunity in China as a 
prime demonstration of this truth.  Wilson claimed that when Americans were 
abroad that “they must first take the disciplines of law” and “seek to serve, 
not subdue, the world.”89  Moreover, Wilson believed that the Constitution 
was a divinely inspired covenant with God and the United States’ crowning 
legal achievement.90 
Not coincidentally, Yuan Shikai’s rise to the Presidency of the Republic 
was tied to his singular ability to manipulate foreign powers for his domestic 
advantage.91  He recognized the character of the United States’ infatuation 
with China,92 and was able to secure the admiration of key members of 
Wilson’s administration.93  Moreover, Yuan specifically convinced Wilson 
that he sought U.S. tutelage.94  In this vein, Yuan was quick to begin work on 
a Chinese Constitution in order to help establish the international legitimacy 
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  PAUL A. VARG, MISSIONARIES, CHINESE, AND DIPLOMATS 169 (1958). 
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  See WARREN COHEN, THE CHINESE CONNECTION 46, 197 (1978).  For an overview of the 
international politics of recognition, see MADELEINE CHI, CHINA DIPLOMACY (1970). 
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  Wilson had a deep teleological faith in the global expansion of democracy, and saw China as the 
first demonstration of America’s leading role in the process.  See generally LLOYD E. AMBROSIUS, 
WOODROW WILSON AND THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC TRADITION (1987).  Wilson was a trained lawyer and 
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critical of the international banking consortium’s effect on Chinese independence, but at the same time 
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CHINESE REVOLUTION 109-14 (1930). 
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  Yuan repeatedly invoked Christianity in his diplomatic work—famously asking Americans to pray 
for the success of the young Republic.  EREZ MANELA, THE WILSONIAN MOMENT 107 (2007).  See also 
PAUL HUTCHONS, CHINA’S REAL REVOLUTION 155 (1924). 
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  William Jennings Bryan sent a book on Thomas Jefferson to Yuan to help in his putative effort to 
produce a “United States of China.”  Jerry Israel, For God, For China, and For Yale, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 
805 (1970). 
94
  LEANG-LI, supra note 91, at 6. 
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of his regime.95  To help showcase his constitutional project to the United 
States, he turned to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(“CEIP”). 
The Endowment, a subsidiary arm of the Carnegie Foundation, was 
founded in 1910, and it reflected the dream of its founder, Andrew Carnegie, 
that international legal cooperation could lead to world peace.  Carnegie 
selected Elihu Root as the first President of the Endowment, along with 
trustees who were luminaries in U.S. politics.  Jonathan Zasloff has argued 
that Root’s views represented a more traditional understanding of U.S. 
participation in international law that rejected much of the idealism of men 
like Carnegie and Wilson.96  Yet, a great deal of Root’s other work at the 
Endowment was guided by a belief in the new view of the U.S. lawyers as 
foreign legal reformer.97  As a result, while Root and Wilson did have very 
different views of international law, their views of the United States’ role in 
Chinese legal reform were in fact quite consonant.  Here, the Foundation’s 
work exemplified the type of private, civil society reformism to which almost 
all U.S. lawyers gave their support.98 
One of Root’s first acts as President of the Carnegie Foundation was to 
send Endowment trustee and Harvard President Charles Eliot to China in 
1912 to advise Yuan on his selection of U.S. legal advisers to assist with the 
writing of the Chinese Constitution.99  In China, Eliot met with Yuan and 
convinced him that it would be better for the Endowment to vet advisers on 
his behalf.  In this way, Frank Goodnow became formally introduced to 
Chinese affairs. 
After Eliot returned to the CEIP, the Endowment quickly conferred 
with Eliot, Wilson and other trustees.  Nicholas Murray Butler, then 
Columbia’s President and CEIP board member, wrote in support of Goodnow 
that “he is the best possible person because he unites the highest type of legal 
scholarship with experience in affairs.”100  Wilson was another founding 
member of APSA, and he had cited Comparative Administrative Law 
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  See Hulsebosch & Golove, supra note 34, at 1061-66. 
96
  Root’s views on international law and foreign policy are the extended focus of Zasloff, Gilded 
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  See FRANK A. NINKOVICH, THE DIPLOMACY OF IDEAS 55 (1981). 
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  The Endowment did engage in the study of public international law related to China, especially 
treaty revisions.  See, e.g., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, TREATIES AND 
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99
  The importance of the Endowment as an informal extension of the American government was 
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100
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throughout his own scholarly work, having called Goodnow “one of the most 
lucid of our [U.S.] writers.”101  Goodnow’s appointment ultimately 
represented the new consensus on legal foreign reform abroad, as there could 
likely have been no greater domestic critic of Goodnow’s legal scholarship 
than Root.  Root not only rejected the positions taken in Goodnow’s scholarly 
work, but in many other contexts he would have considered Goodnow’s 
Progressive legal views decidedly “un-American.”102  However, with little 
dispute, in 1913 the CEIP extended to Goodnow a three-year contract, at a 
lucrative $13,000 per annum salary, to travel to China and serve as Yuan 
Shikai’s legal adviser and shape the drafting of a new constitution.103 
Goodnow, like many Americans of this time, possessed a basic 
familiarity with Chinese affairs.  In fact, during the summer of 1903 he had 
traveled to China and Japan.104  Given his renown, international scholars often 
approached him for advice, and he corresponded with members of the 
Chinese Legation in Berlin over the study of U.S. administrative law.105  
Although little is known about their relationship, Goodnow was also a mentor 
to V. K. Wellington Koo at Columbia prior to Wellington Koo’s storied 
diplomatic career for China.106 
Yet, Goodnow clearly did not have a robust academic or intellectual 
knowledge of China.107  At first blush, his belief in the universality of human 
governance made it less analytically pressing that he obtain a deep knowledge 
of China’s cultural particularities.  Nevertheless, his knowledge of China fell 
far short of the standard he had held himself to in his previous work.  
Furthermore, his acceptance of CEIP’s offer reflected what would eventually 
become the most telling quality of his tenure in China:  his shared 
presumption that the technocratic expertise that was transforming the United 
States could also transform China. 
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Goodnow was not unreflective about his own lack of knowledge about 
China.  He wrote to Eliot prior to leaving for China about his “ignorance of 
Chinese conditions.”108  Nor was he shy about this fact.  In a statement to the 
New York Times about his appointment, he said, “I have been to China . . . but 
only to its outskirts.  I have not been into the interior, and when I was there I 
was only a casual visitor.  I really cannot say what the scope of my 
prospective task is to be.”109  But this evaluation of his own ignorance did 
little to dampen his initial enthusiasm.110 
Goodnow’s appointment was greeted with enthusiasm both publicly 
and privately.  John Burgess wrote to his former student with great pride and 
in the lofty sentiment of the era:  “It is a great opportunity, and I have the 
feeling that you may be able to be to the China of today what Confucius was 
to it in the hoary past.”111  Another long-time lawyer correspondent wrote to 
Goodnow that “I am greatly pleased to see that the opportunity of the 
generation in constitutional building has been offered you.”112  Newspaper 
commentaries used similar language.  One clipping Goodnow kept for himself 
claimed that “China will be a vast gainer by listening to his counsel” and 
“[h]is work at Peking will be in the highest sense a duty to humanity and to 
civilization.”113  Not surprisingly, then, several ambitious individuals tried to 
join Goodnow in what was obviously an elite posting.114 
It is interesting to note that the Chinese government characterized 
Goodnow’s appointment in much less grandiose terms.  At the time of his 
initial appointment, James Scott, secretary of the CEIP, wrote to Goodnow 
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that “[t]he Minister adds that the duties of the adviser will be advisory rather 
than constructive, the Chinese intending to prepare their own constitution and 
desiring an adviser to revise and modify the instrument so as to make it 
consistent in all its parts.”115  This marginalizing of foreign advisers was 
characteristic of China’s regimes throughout the post-1911 era.  However, this 
significant detail was drowned out in the otherwise laudatory language that 
celebrated Goodnow’s imminent impact on China.116  Thus, in contrast to 
Goodnow’s traditional portrayal as a casual neophyte, Goodnow arrived in 
China armed with a decade of colonial study and a popular mandate that saw 
it as his mission to help China progress to the ranks of civilized nations. 
III. GOODNOW’S COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS APPLIED SCIENCE 
A. Comparative Constitutionalism as Scientific Enterprise 
 
Goodnow arrived in Beijing in early May of 1913.  It is unclear 
whether he ever left Beijing, but from the beginning he and his wife were a 
hot commodity in expatriate and governmental social circles.117  From his 
records, he seems to have spent most of his time reading, and he formed few 
lasting personal connections during his tenure.118  If his personal letters are 
any indication, much of his life was more concerned with mundane daily life 
than any grand reform agenda.119  Goodnow’s contact with the Chinese 
government included periodic meetings with Yuan and an official affiliation 
with the Bureau of Legislation, an advisory body attached to Yuan’s Cabinet.  
He had no formal relations with Parliament upon his arrival, as they had not 
been consulted about his appointment.120 
On the ground, Goodnow’s life was functionally mediated by the U.S. 
missionary community, and it was Charles Eliot’s missionary contacts in 
China that formed the basis of Goodnow’s personal network in China.121  
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Goodnow also developed a personal relationship with the first resident 
Methodist minister in China, James Bashford.122  Later, Goodnow would 
relate to others that whatever particular knowledge he eventually gained about 
China was primarily drawn from missionary sources.123 
Goodnow’s spirits were buoyant during his first months in China.  He 
agreed to teach a course on constitutional law at Beijing University in the fall.  
He began giving lectures, which would be routinely published in both 
English-language and Chinese newspapers.  It was at this point that he 
seemed most content concerning his influence on Chinese developments:  
“The result is that I am getting considerable publicity for my views, which 
was what I was after.”124  His most significant correspondence during his time 
abroad was with Nicholas Butler, who served as his primary contact at CEIP 
and for whom Goodnow served as a conduit of direct information about 
Chinese political developments.125 
During this time, Goodnow busied himself with a range of distinctive 
academic writings on China.  One of the areas that attracted a great deal of his 
interest was the reform of the Chinese educational system126 and the 
development of professional academies for Chinese civil servants.127  
Blending various models emerging in the United States, Goodnow’s legal 
curriculum combined comparative humanistic and technical subjects as well 
as a specialized tract for judges.128  He even had time to research an article on 
Marco Polo129 and another on the history of printing in China.130 
It was also during this time that Goodnow began to explicitly tackle the 
larger task of applying his legal ideas to the Chinese context.131  True to his 
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comparative methods, he contemplated a hybrid government that “combines 
the Asiatic idea of strength with the European idea of popular co-
operation.”132  Yet, few of these ideas made it into any of his published work 
except his emphasis on strong property rights as a core component of Western 
prosperity.133  It is apparent from these writings that Goodnow planned to use 
his experience in China to enhance the stature of his own ideas at home.  In 
this respect, he was participating in the transnational flow of intellectual 
capital that Progressives drew from foreign work.134  
The bulk of Goodnow’s initial work in China was focused on the 
Chinese Constitution.  The first official material he produced in his capacity 
as an adviser was a critique of the legislature’s draft constitution.  Ever the 
proponent of centralized power, Goodnow claimed that the draft gave too few 
powers to the President.  He based his position on the fact that China was not 
a homogenous country and thus not suited to parliamentary rule.  In this way, 
Goodnow expressed his characteristic belief in the universality of 
government, though he had little familiarity with Chinese politics or political 
traditions.  Echoing the conclusions of his work on colonial administration, he 
also used the Chinese example to criticize the transplantation of English 
parliamentary rule to a variety of countries.135  Throughout his comparative 
constitutional work in China, Goodnow repeatedly invoked his critique of a 
strict adherence to the juris-centric interpretation of the common law and the 
rigidity of the U.S. Constitution.136  
Feeling that his early advice had not been heeded by the legislature, 
Goodnow quickly took the initiative to write his own draft constitution.137  
This draft emphasized a strong executive power while devolving less power 
to the provinces, mirroring his distaste for federalism. 
Shortly after Goodnow’s arrival, Yuan’s regime became embroiled in 
conflict; after Yuan suppressed the rebellion, he purged the parliament.  In the 
wake of this rebellion, Yuan grew far more interested in Goodnow’s 
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constitutional ideas.  During this time, Goodnow continued to write about 
China’s optimal constitutional structure, emphasizing the need for executive 
power in light of China’s lack of strong class interests.138  He also argued for 
the utility of an advisory council to Yuan, not as a true legislative body, but 
rather as a representative body to popularize his decisions.139 
Under Yuan’s shadow, in early 1914 a new constitution was adopted 
that actually incorporated a great deal of Goodnow’s draft.140  The text was 
replete with claims of equality, privacy, and various liberal freedoms.141  At 
the same time, it gave the president the power to confer “titles of nobility,”142 
and clearly recognized the primacy of state power, including language that 
rights existed “within the limits of the statutes” and “in accordance with the 
provisions of law and ordinance” and “not in conflict with . . . discipline of 
the Army and Navy.”143  Similarly, the Constitution called for government 
transparency but added that “when . . . it is considered that publicity may be 
prejudicial to peace and order, or to public morality, secrecy may be 
observed.”144  Moreover, whatever aspirations the Constitution expressed, 
there were certainly many leaders in China who doubted Yuan’s support for 
its more aspirational implementation.145 
 
B. Comparative Legal Science and the Primacy of Local Politics 
Goodnow’s early constitutional work in China was greeted with the 
same broad enthusiasm as his appointment.  George Morrison, Yuan’s first 
foreign political adviser from Australia, wrote to Charles Eliot soon after 
Goodnow’s arrival “[y]our selection has given universal satisfaction.  
Professor Goodnow arrived here a few days ago and has immediately won the 
regard of everyone whom he has met whether Chinese or foreign.”146  
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Morrison also reinforced the importance of the CEIP’s sponsorship of 
Goodnow, claiming that Yuan was a steadfast supporter of Wilson’s new 
administration.147 
Newspaper reporting about Goodnow’s efforts was equally consistent 
and continued to glamorize his work.  The Baltimore Evening Post claimed 
that he was “making China’s new law” and reprinted his review of the 
provisional constitution in full.148  Jeremiah Jenks, another leading 
Progressive intellectual and then President of New York University, lauded 
Goodnow’s work in the New York Times and claimed that his advice had led 
to Yuan’s decision to adopt an U.S.-style Cabinet.149  In these accounts, 
Goodnow, although a private citizen under the employ of the Chinese 
government, was nevertheless portrayed as an agent of U.S. interests, with 
Jenks claiming that “in turning to Washington and the American plan for 
guidance, Yuan Shikai once more demonstrates the great wisdom, the true 
democracy of this Moses of Cathay.”150 
Goodnow quickly became a leading “China expert” in the United 
States.  The major luminaries of Sino-U.S. relations who came through 
Beijing during this time invariably met with him.  William Rockhill, the 
famed U.S. diplomat, visited Goodnow and praised his work as the cause of 
greater order and stability in China.151  John Rockefeller wrote to Goodnow 
asking him to be a board member on the Rockefeller Foundation’s China 
Medical Board, which was the Foundation’s first major project in China.152 
The most notable deviations from this broad endorsement of Goodnow 
were primarily personal and private.  One friend made the uncharacteristic 
statement that “[w]e need men like you over here more than they do in China.  
Those ‘Chinese’ have forgotten things about the philosophy of life that we 
haven’t yet learned.”153  Goodnow and his wife corresponded frequently with 
their children, and his son David repeatedly queried his father as to whether 
he would be staying the full three years.154 
However, as well received as Goodnow’s appointment was at home, 
and as productive as he was as a scholar during his early tenure, the popular 
image of his work in China fell far short of reality.  It was during this period 
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that Wilson withdrew from the international banking consortium that had 
been organized during the Taft Administration to make loans to Yuan’s 
regime.  Although part of Wilson’s self-perceived non-imperial stance 
towards China, Yuan had used funding from the consortium to suppress the 
southern rebellion, and Goodnow felt that Wilson’s withdrawal weakened his 
position as an adviser.155 
Concurrently, Goodnow’s developing evaluation of legal reform under 
Yuan is revealed in his correspondence with Nicholas Butler.  Exhibiting a 
clear public/private split, what Goodnow disclosed to Butler in his private 
letters was in sharp contrast to his public writings and claims.  Early on, 
Goodnow’s sense of empowerment in China gave rise to an imagined ease of 
reform implementation which made the known complexities of reform in the 
United States appear, at first blush, burdensome by comparison.  However, 
even at his most optimistic, Goodnow could never provide evidence that his 
legal reform ideas were being considered and instead solely asserted that he 
believed that his ideas had important supporters.156 
Goodnow’s personal correspondence clearly reveals that his early 
optimism quickly gave way to frustration.  Writing to Butler, Goodnow 
claimed that, “as I look at it these Chinese have hardly the faintest idea of 
what a constitution is.  They do not, I think, even know what law is.”157  
Finding the country far more unstable than he had expected, Goodnow 
lamented that “China is incoherent” and even when he submitted his draft 
constitution he was agnostic as to whether it “may go into the waste paper 
basket.”158 
Goodnow’s dissatisfaction with China ebbed and flowed, but gradually 
deepened over time.  A month after he submitted his draft constitution he told 
Butler, “My work is somewhat in a lull at present.  A ‘lull’ in China is a full 
stop.  They are always at a lull according to our ideas.”159  No doubt 
motivated by the fact that the Chinese did not move to implement his ideas, 
Goodnow claimed that in China “individualism has been so rampant that they 
do not seem to have any conception of social obligation.”160  Significantly, he 
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cited the political instability in China as a reason to believe that “constitution-
making has really ceased to have any practical political importance.”161 
He told Butler that Yuan had expressed little interest in having students 
trained in Western political science, and that even among the intellectual 
classes China was totally disorganized.162  He further confided to Butler 
several critiques of academic freedom under Yuan, commenting on the 
ejection of students and professors from Chinese universities on political 
grounds.163 
Goodnow’s lack of direct participation in Chinese politics helps explain 
why he was so prolific a writer in this short period of time.  Not five months 
after his arrival, he was spending most of his time preparing his academic 
lectures.  Again, he was hardly sanguine about the utility of his efforts as “the 
lectures are rather elementary, but that makes little difference as nobody over 
here knows anything, about constitutional or, indeed, about any other kind of 
law.”164  He also made several notes as to his annoyance with the various 
“fool statements” made by his Chinese audiences.165  Yet, Goodnow 
continued to contemplate what the CEIP could do with its interest in China.166  
It was early in 1914 when Goodnow was approached to become Dean 
of the Johns Hopkins University (“JHU”).  JHU was a leading prototype for 
the modern U.S. university and a central hub for the elite of Wilson’s 
Progressive cohort.  The international circulation of political and intellectual 
capital in the era was evident in how announcements of Goodnow’s deanship 
often cited his China experience as a key asset.167  Goodnow accepted the 
offer with little hesitation.  However, his desire to terminate his China 
contract more than two years early was initially met with resistance by the 
trustees of the CEIP.168  Butler continued to urge Goodnow to stay in China 
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because he worried that his departure would have a negative impact on the 
U.S. image in China.  He also told Goodnow that “some of the businessmen 
here feel that American prestige in the East is at stake in your carrying your 
work through to the end.”169 
Yet Goodnow was adamant.  He told Butler that “[t]he Carnegie 
Endowment’s nominee is in danger of becoming merely a charge upon the 
strained finances of the country and is not fulfilling any useful purpose.”170  In 
a February 16, 1914 letter to Butler, Goodnow released the full fury of his 
dissatisfaction with his time in China.  He felt that the parliament was hostile 
to his presence and “either refused or neglected to admit me to its 
deliberations or to ask my advice.”171  He said explicitly that the Chinese had 
no desire to liberalize or democratize:   
Young China has lost control, the old ideas of Chinese 
absolutism are now in the ascendency, the prospect of adopting 
a constitution on western lines has been set back for perhaps 25 
years; indeed such a constitution may never be adopted” and 
“whatever course China did take,” it would “be little if any 
influenced by foreign advice.172 
Goodnow also highlighted how rising Chinese nationalism complicated 
the work of advisers as “frequent complaints appear in the press of the heavy 
and useless expense of foreign advisers.”173  He rejected the notion that he 
was doing anything of particular service to America, or that his appointment 
by the Chinese government was solely to secure recognition for the regime.  
Summarily, he noted that many in China knew that “[t]he appointment of 
foreign advisers is thought often to be due to their desire to please the foreign 
nation concerned.”174  Perhaps part of Goodnow’s aggravated sense of 
alienation was the fact that members of Yuan’s regime, who claimed to be 
happy with, but seemingly indifferent to, his work displayed little resistance 
to his leaving.  One official actually gave the opinion that Goodnow would be 
more useful to China as President of JHU than as a legal adviser.175 
In his last letter to persuade the CEIP to release him, Goodnow roundly 
condemned the Chinese government and the Chinese people.  He claimed 
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that, “[t]here is so much graft and corruption, so much ignorance on the part 
of the mass of the people, and so little practical common sense on the part of 
about all the leaders here except the President.”176  He also repeated his claim 
that “the importance of the position of adviser to this government is greatly 
exaggerated” because the Chinese had a “total lack of any idea of law.”177  In 
no uncertain terms, he asserted that this rendered foreign advisers all but 
useless in China:  
My feeling was and is that the Chinese, the experience of all the 
advisers here would seem to show, have really no serious 
intention of following the advice of their advisers, unless that 
advice agrees with their own conclusions.  Indeed, they regard 
their advisers as almost entirely ornamental in character and 
seldom let us know what is really going on.  All we do is to 
write essays which are translated into Chinese and then what 
happens to them Heaven only knows.178 
The ultimate consequence of this state of affairs, Goodnow concluded, was 
that any objective advice he gave would only be used to justify further 
government power grabs: 
This will not be because I am in favor of absolutism even for 
China, but because my advice will be asked with regard to 
some one point while the general problem will not be presented 
to me.  I am, thus, in favor of a strong executive, which they 
know.  I have already and undoubtedly in the future will be 
asked to write opinions on that point and have already given 
and will give opinions in favor of it . . . . I am therefore being 
forced into the position of, to use the words of Admiral Tsai, 
assisting to centralize the power of Yuan.  This I do not 
altogether like.  For, although I believe that what China needs at 
the present time is the strong arm, I would like to see the 
Chinese making the attempt at any rate to establish a form of 
government which may in the future develop along western 
lines.179 
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Butler and the other trustees of the CEIP eventually consented to 
Goodnow’s desire to leave China and become president of JHU.  
Nevertheless, he agreed to stay through the summer of 1914, solely at Yuan’s 
personal request.180  Even when the 1914 provisional constitution containing 
many of his ideas was adopted, Goodnow was unmoved.  He told Butler that 
the constitution in fact gave too much power to Yuan and that in the end “the 
Chinese will not live up to any constitution that they adopted.  It is not in 
them.  They have no conception of the rule of law.  They have no courts 
worthy of the name.”181  Yet for all his protests, Goodnow agreed to stay on 
nominally as Yuan’s adviser even after he returned to the United States.182 
 
C. From Comparative Lawyer to Expert Propagandist 
Goodnow returned to the United States at the end of the summer of 
1914 to begin what would become a quite successful tenure as President of 
JHU.  What is striking about his activity in the following year is that he 
continued to publically support Yuan, in both journalistic and academic 
publications.  He did not publicly claim that his mission had been in vain nor 
did he question his own particular expertise.  He continued to draw on his 
experience in China as intellectual capital to bolster his own ideas at home 
and he continued to give his personal allegiance to Yuan as the savior of an 
otherwise dysfunctional society.  As a result, as critical as he was of China 
privately, publically he was unable to accept the failure of his good intentions 
and technocratic ambitions.  In fact, at Yuan’s personal behest, Goodnow 
returned to Beijing for six weeks during the summer of 1915.183 
During this year stateside, Goodnow’s quick departure from China 
provided fodder to those who had been critical of Wilson’s approach to 
China.184  Many were quick to point out the authoritarian nature of Yuan’s 
actions and contested formal diplomatic recognition of his regime.  However, 
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Goodnow was quick to respond to such criticisms and shortly after his return 
he began to play an active role in Yuan’s courting of international favor. 
Goodnow was frequently quoted in both the local Baltimore Evening 
Sun and the New York Times responding to criticisms of Yuan.  In his 
comments, he would often emphasize the Japanese example where legal 
change in Asia was gradual and led by strong central leadership.185  Goodnow 
publicly admitted that Yuan had no real checks on his power, but he called 
attention to Yuan’s moral virtue and fostered the image of Yuan as a defiant 
modernizer.186  Thus, by implication, whatever actions Yuan took were 
justifiably necessary to pave the way for a permanent constitution that would 
eventually be expressive of some form of representative, democratic 
assembly. 
Throughout his public addresses and academic writings, Goodnow 
clearly affirmed the idea that China would soon “Westernize” and asserted the 
superior efficiency of Western forms of governance over those of the East.187 
He phrased these legal claims in broad scientific terms, citing evidence from 
Chinese natural science, demographics, economic structure, and 
agriculture.188  He used the authority of an objective legal science to shield 
himself from normative arguments about what China should be doing, and the 
claim that a proper analysis of Chinese legal development was one divorced 
from morality.189 
In this way, Goodnow never refrained from claiming that his work in 
China was based on his scientific evaluations as a comparativist.190  He 
recurrently presented Yuan as a reluctant wielder of power, whose hand was 
forced by exigent circumstance.  To this end, Goodnow repeated his earlier 
critique of the first draft constitution as “framed with little regard to Chinese 
conditions” and “based on the theory that a constitution itself would exercise 
a controlling influence on political action regardless of the conditions and 
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traditions of the people to which it applied.”191  He gave Yuan credit for 
“Western” educational reform during his time in Tianjin and the creation of a 
“modern army.”192  He described Yuan as being only “comparatively 
conservative” when opposed to the “radical and theoretical.”193 
When specifically addressing Chinese law, Goodnow gave faint praise 
to “Oriental idealism”194 but claimed that basic rule of law principles, even 
judicial independence, were far more important to Asia’s future.195  Goodnow 
told his audience that the “absence of the rule of law” in China was 
demonstrated by the limited power of central law to modify the unruly and 
undisciplined nature of the Chinese people.196  Thus, while “China’s attitude 
toward the introduction of Western ideas has been for the most part one of 
hostility,”197 this “is an attitude which must and will be abandoned.”198 
Goodnow believed that China had traditionally been “the home of 
laissez-fare.”199  This independence and legacy of freedom was for him a 
hindrance to progress, not a foundation for liberty.  Thus, when it came to the 
role of law in Chinese daily life, “laws and edicts have been issued to 
supplement the force of moral precept and customary usage has usually been 
deemed expedient to convince those affected by them of the reasonableness of 
the action proposed to be taken.”200  This lack of social coordination formed 
the basis for his claim that Yuan’s empowerment was simply the scientifically 
observable outgrowth of Chinese conditions.201  His central example was 
corporate law, which he cast as an essentially cooperative act where law and 
social morality must mutually reinforce each other.202 
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In fact, much of Goodnow’s specific claims about Chinese law were 
generally well received by the U.S. legal community.  Simeon Baldwin, a 
founding member and one-time President of the American Bar Association 
who had also taken on the Directorship of the Association’s Bureau of 
Comparative Law, specifically cited Goodnow’s work as an ideal of 
comparative work and his analysis of China’s financial institutions as a 
“searching inquiry.” 203 
Goodnow also used his version of Chinese affairs to highlight his own 
critique of the inflexible and “superstitious” presumptions of U.S. legal 
parochialism, now casting it as not only harmful to the U.S. domestically but 
to China as well.204  Goodnow used critiques of his work in China which 
supported Republicanism to reaffirm his claim that U.S. parochialism was a 
hindrance to an expert evaluation of China, and support his anti-formalist 
critique of comparative constitutionalism.205 
Goodnow turned this anti-parochialism to the aid of Yuan by arguing 
that bad news had to be interpreted with an eye to the gradual, teleological 
progression of China as it shed the backward elements of its history.  He knew 
it was “of course somewhat disconcerting to the ardent republican who 
regards a republic as a government of the people, by the people and for the 
people” but reminded his reader that “China has never really known any sort 
of government but personal government in accordance with immemorial 
custom.”206  As such, “the problems of the present are rather those of 
efficiency and stability than of liberty and popular government.”207  Goodnow 
sought herein to accommodate Chinese culture within a universal frame:   
It is extremely doubtful whether any real progress in the 
direction of constitutional government in China will be made by 
a too violent departure from past traditions, by the attempt, in 
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order to apply a general political theory, to establish a form of 
government, which, while suited to other countries, does not 
take into account the peculiar history of China and the social 
and economic conditions of the country.208 
Goodnow turned to this form of argument to support the power the 
current Chinese constitutional had vested in Yuan using the language of 
emergency power:  “The adoption of the rule of law and the protection of 
private rights” is thus important in “ordinary times.”209  Superficially, he 
supported freedom of speech in China as “only where the press has a 
reasonable freedom that private rights are protected and that progress in 
popular government is possible.”210  However, he issued the caveat that this 
was acceptable “provided [that] such criticism does not take the form of 
seditious utterance.”211  Again, the essential circularity of his argument was 
only resolved when he assumed the inevitability of teleological progress:  
“China’s lack of discipline and her disregard of individual rights make it 
probable that a form of government which has many of the earmarks of 
absolutism must continue until she develops greater submission to political 
authority, greater powers of social cooperation and greater regard for private 
rights.”212 
Goodnow buttressed these claims with sharp challenges to the expertise 
of outside critics by drawing on his experience as an adviser.  He stated that 
“no one therefore who is not acquainted with the ins and outs of Chinese 
political life can sit in judgment upon the particular acts of the President in 
the great struggle which he has been conducting with such consummate skill 
during the past two or three years.”213  In contrast, based on his experience he 
could confidently “express an opinion as to the general result” that Yuan was 
“bringing order out of disorder”214 and “endeavoring to lead China into the 
paths of constitutional government as fast as her faltering steps will 
permit.”215  Thus, in practical terms, he held that only a rare intermediary 
figure like himself could correct both Chinese and U.S. misconceptions and 
then divine the truth of where Chinese law was and should be going. 
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As a result, Goodnow felt at ease making abstract concessions to 
“Chinese traditions and history” and the “peculiarities of Chinese life” that 
shape a “Chinese problem” while at the same time dismissing his Chinese 
opponents as “denationalized” consumers of a naively idealized Western 
republicanism who sought to crudely “copy Europe.”216  Pro-republican U.S. 
and European critics would also need to recognize that until “the social and 
economic conditions are quite different from what they are at present and bear 
a closer resemblance to the conditions of the West, it is useless to expect that 
a political organization based upon the conditions of the West can be 
advantageously adopted in China.”217 
This framework situated Goodnow in the role of universal critic.218  He 
could declare that “China should be careful both to guard against the 
enthusiasm of the recent convert to new ideas” while at the same time arguing 
that his critical expertise was needed as “[China] should also endeavor to 
avoid the mistakes of which Europeans have been guilty and, in the new life 
which will spring up in the country, attempt to remedy those defects of 
Western civilization the existence of which the most ardent admirer of the 
West will not deny.”219 
Goodnow’s writings thus reflected the mutualistic pattern between him 
and Yuan, with Yuan gaining propaganda support and Goodnow drawing on 
his tenure in China to bolster his intellectual stature and promote his personal 
views in the United States. 
IV. THE NEW AGE FOR U.S. LAW AND GOODNOW’S FALL FROM GRACE  
A. The Transgression of Monarchy over Republicanism 
 The supreme confidence that marked Goodnow’s public discourse 
continued to belie the deep cynicism revealed in his personal letters.  
Notwithstanding his frustrating experience in China, he could not let go of the 
ideas that he knew what China needed and that there was something he could 
do to move it in the direction he divined necessary.  He had quickly learned 
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that he could not bypass Chinese politics, but he still saw a role for himself in 
it.  The lynchpin in his thinking was his relationship with Yuan. 
The source of Goodnow’s loyalty to Yuan is not initially obvious, but it 
was immediately clear upon his arrival in China.  In his first letter to Butler in 
May of 1913, he claimed that “[Yuan Shikai] struck me as a man of great 
force and withal quite genial and kindly.”220  He would repeat this sentiment 
throughout his personal letters in which he was at his most honest:  “I may be 
wrong, but I think he is honestly desirous of saving his country . . . He thinks 
that this can be done only through what is practically autocratic government 
and I am inclined to think he is right.”221  Yet, Yuan more often than not 
ignored Goodnow’s advice, and late in Goodnow’s stay in China Yuan 
became more distant.  Goodnow even harbored suspicions about Yuan’s 
eldest son:  “Either the young man has taken quite a fancy to me or the 
President is using this way to find out what my views are.”222 
It is clear throughout both Goodnow’s public and private writings that 
Yuan served as a logically necessary liminal figure for Goodnow.  Although 
Yuan was Chinese, but he was perceived by Goodnow not to be “Chinese” in 
the ways that Goodnow believed stunted China’s legal development.  
Goodnow felt Yuan was incapable of producing the expert knowledge that he 
could generate, but that Yuan recognized his expertise and authority.  In this 
light, he took Yuan’s exceptional personal qualities and used them as the 
medium through which his expert knowledge would be actuated in China. 
When Goodnow returned to China in the summer of 1915, he produced 
for Yuan a new comparative memorandum on republicanism and monarchy.  
Ironically, this final act as legal adviser played out much as his earlier letters 
foreshadowed. 
The memo to Yuan that Goodnow produced would soon overshadow 
the entirety of his career’s earlier work and arguably remains his most famous 
piece of writing.  Titled simply Monarchy or Republic?,223  what came to be 
referred to as the “Goodnow Memo” (“Memo”) laid out the argument for 
constitutional monarchy in China.  Just a few short pages, the Memo distills 
the various claims that Goodnow had already made in his earlier writings.  He 
reiterated that “the form of government which a country possesses is for the 
most part determined by the necessities of practical life” and “seldom, if 
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ever . . . the result of the conscious choice of the people of that country.”224  
He made clear in this assessment that the republican system in China was a 
failure, and that any sober-minded comparative constitutional analysis would 
yield the same conclusion.225 
Goodnow’s language in support of monarchy is equally 
straightforward:  “It is of course not susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is 
better suited than a republic to China.”226  He focused on the inherent stability 
of the monarchical system, which he claimed was required for China to resist 
foreign subordination.  In an obvious defense and approval of Yuan, 
Goodnow compared the current state of affairs in China to the aftermath of 
the American Revolution, when “had General Washington had the desire to 
become a monarch himself he would probably have been successful.”227  He 
then claimed that where “the intelligence of whose people is not high . . . a 
republican form of government . . . generally leads to the worst form of 
government, namely, that of the military dictator.”228  He discusses the “living 
stream of continuous internal disturbance” in Latin America as his primary 
examples.229  
Goodnow set out conditions for the transition to a monarchy under 
Yuan, emphasizing orderly succession, and warned that “the government will 
never develop the necessary strength unless it has the cordial support of the 
people.”230  Goodnow claimed that his advice should be shared by “those who 
have the welfare of China at heart.”231 
Prior to the production of the Memo, Yuan had been contemplating 
declaring himself monarch for at least a year.232  Late in 1914, he began to 
participate in rituals traditionally performed by the Chinese emperor.  He was 
supported by his conservative allies who favored stability for commerce and 
international negotiation and who had grown weary of trying to appease his 
political opponents in southern China.  The delivery of Goodnow’s memo was 
seized upon as a tool for publicly justifying the move.  Yuan’s supporters 
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organized what is now known as the Peace Planning Society or, as then 
transliterated, Chou An-Hui.  Yuan bought Western newspaper space to 
circulate the Memo and legitimate his move internationally.233  
In the United States, Goodnow’s support of Yuan’s move was widely 
cited.  In a New York Times article, Yuan Now Plans to Be Emperor, Yuan was 
quoted as having considered monarchy only after he was “urged by 
[Professor] Goodnow.”234  The article also mentioned that the Memo’s 
authority rested in the fact that “[a]s Professor Goodnow is a citizen of a 
republic, he is more competent to make such a statement than others.”235  
Goodnow was portrayed as a close ally to Yuan, having “secured the 
confidence of Yuan Shih-kai by advice given during former critical times.”236  
As Goodnow intended, Yuan is portrayed as a reluctant unifier, initially 
agnostic in respect to the issue of monarchy: “A certain doctor gave me an 
exhaustive dissertation on the advantages and disadvantages accruing from 
monarchical and republican governments.  I answered him that, being the 
[p]resident of a republic, I was in no position to discuss the question.”237 
Goodnow was also quoted as assenting to this use of his Memo, as he 
“did not mind his name being used by the Monarchists if it would assist in the 
peaceful promotion of a monarchy and the welfare of China.”238  In a follow-
up article just two days later, he issued the caveat that the turn to monarchy 
“should be made acceptable to both the thinking people of China and the 
foreign powers.”239 
The circulation of the Memo caused a backlash in China.  It drew fierce 
criticism from a range of leading Chinese intellectuals, including former 
monarchists Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei.  Goodnow’s Memo was 
attacked in China on many grounds, most notably on its omission of any 
account of the actual instability of various monarchial regimes of the era.  
Nonetheless, this initial backlash did not stop Yuan from officially laying 
claim to the throne in December 1915. 
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B. The Shifting Tide of U.S. Legal Internationalism 
Traditionally, scholars have cast domestic U.S. reaction to Yuan’s 
establishment of a monarchy as being one of universal disapproval.240  
Indeed, there were many contemporaries who moved without hesitation to 
vilify Goodnow after Yuan’s move.  A representative example was the widely 
cited book, The Fight for the Republic in China, written in 1917 by Betram 
Weale, a long-time traveler and commentator on Chinese affairs.  Weale 
pointed out that Goodnow’s claims about China were based on his isolated 
experience in Beijing and he chided Goodnow for rarely leaving the capital.241  
Weale further asserted that the true leaders of China were “nonplussed by the 
insouciance displayed by the peripatetic legal authority,”242 and he criticized 
Goodnow’s claims about the “low political knowledge” of the Chinese 
people.243  Weale rejected out of hand the notion that any foreigner should 
question China’s movement towards introducing modern political institutions, 
criticizing “the utter levity of those who should have realized from the first 
that the New China is a matter of life and death to the people, and that the 
first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new beliefs.”244  He reproduced 
a tract by a prominent Chinese scholar who argued that it was wrong to 
interpret Yuan’s move as legitimate, and equally wrong to take the 
conservatives’ ideas and “now suddenly make a fetish of them because they 
have come out of the mouth of a foreigner.”245 
Tellingly, Beale also referenced more conservative elements in U.S. 
politics and painted Goodnow with an anti-American brush.  Beale stated that 
Goodnow “[specializes] in that department known as Administrative Law 
which has no place, fortunately, in Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the State.”246 
Condemnation of Goodnow was also fueled by the growing 
international network of GMD supporters.247  Tang Shaoyi, another Columbia 
University graduate, had served as the first President of the Republic under 
Yuan, but left before Goodnow’s arrival—having been quickly dissatisfied 
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with Yuan’s authoritarian ways.  Tang told the New York Times that 
“Dr. Goodnow was used simply as a tool.  He is a great scholar, a professor, a 
citizen of a great republic, but he was duped by the monarchist faction, 
because he did not have a real insight into the situation.”248 
Yet condemnation of Goodnow was far from universal.  A Columbia 
University colleague, William Shepherd, reviewed Weale’s book and made a 
much more dispassionate analysis of Goodnow’s work.  He noted that Weale 
was “distinctly belligerent in his attitude toward Dr. Goodnow” and that “the 
kind of ‘advice’ that he is alleged to have given [does] not seem easily 
refutable.”249  Shepherd did find that the Goodnow Memo, as presented by 
Weale, “certainly does find strange misconceptions in it of English and 
Spanish-American history in its applicability to Chinese conditions.”250  
However, Shepherd defended Goodnow’s credentials and noted the growing 
relevance of his expertise in common law systems.251 
Reaction to Yuan’s ascension and Goodnow’s role were decidedly 
mixed in the U.S. press.  Editorials in U.S. and British newspapers friendly to 
the Republican movement were critical of Goodnow, including his own local 
Baltimore Sun.252  But other newspapers, from the New York Times to the 
Washington Post, found no problem with Goodnow’s recommendation.253  
Within China itself, many U.S. business interests still favored the stability of 
monarchy, and Goodnow was defended in the pro-commerce Journal of the 
American Asiatic Association.254  At the time, many legal scholars and 
lawyers connected to China came to Goodnow’s defense.  Firebrand 
extraterritorial U.S. Court for China Judge Lebbeus Wilfley defended Yuan 
and Goodnow, claiming that both were making an honest effort to build a 
responsible government.255 
Most of these defenses, however, did make it clear that, whatever 
Goodnow’s recommendations were, in the end China would follow the United 
States’ lead.  Paul Reinsch, still Minister to China, claimed that Goodnow was 
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innocent of charges of complicity, though insisting that Goodnow was not 
consulted in the decision to declare monarchy.256  Reinsch further asserted 
that Goodnow’s emphasis on fostering a gradual movement to elections and 
democracy was prudent given the circumstances, and that U.S. audiences 
should understand that Goodnow still felt that China would eventually follow 
the United States’ lead.257   
As such, Goodnow continued to be approached as a China expert for a 
time after the Memo was issued.  One lawyer told Goodnow that he still 
referred questions about China to Goodnow because “[Goodnow] knew more 
about China than any other man in the U.S.”258  Thomas Millard, likely then 
the most famous U.S. journalist of the Far East, asked Goodnow to comment 
on a draft of one of his early books even though Millard was himself a long-
time loyalist to Yuan’s foes.259  Moreover, Goodnow was still invited to give 
lectures on China, including for business interests such as Bethlehem Steel.260  
He also continued his work on the China Medical Board and participated in 
various reports on foreign educational systems commissioned by the 
Association of American Universities.261  He even received requests to make 
comments on papers about colonial administration.262  
This diversity of reaction notwithstanding, the negative reaction that 
had the greatest impact on Goodnow’s career was that rendered by the 
dissatisfied members of the CEIP and the larger Wilsonian foreign policy 
elite.  Wilson was known to have been embarrassed by Goodnow’s 
association with the monarchist movement, and Eliot and the other members 
of the CEIP clearly expressed their displeasure with Goodnow when he 
attempted to leave his post.  Goodnow himself had stated that he anticipated 
such trouble from on high when he returned from his 1915 trip.263  In contrast 
to his Progressive cohorts who remained involved in foreign affairs, over time 
Goodnow was blacklisted by members of the foreign policy establishment at 
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the vanguard of the internationalism that Goodnow had resisted in message, if 
not in medium. 
The fact that those who were so disappointed with Goodnow’s tenure 
failed to foresee the controversy that arose from his involvement defies 
explanation.  From the very outset, the institutional parties involved in 
bringing him to China and the broader U.S. public saw him as a distinctly 
U.S. agent.  Yet he resisted the characterization, claiming at various times that 
he carried no U.S. “mandate or mission for this country.”264  Most acutely, 
any brief familiarity with Goodnow’s work should have given warning that he 
had little identification with U.S. law, even if he considered himself a 
republican citizen.  
Progressives of the era evidently did not consider the possibility that 
Goodnow would carry his faith in expert science to such an extent that it 
would lack any conscious normative or national character.  For Goodnow, it 
was important that Chinese law go wherever science would take it.  In 
contrast, Americans had long projected an idealized image of their 
governmental system as appropriate for China, where liberty, order, and 
efficiency could all peacefully coexist. 
The expectation that U.S. influence should be “Americanizing” first, 
and carried out by any particular method second, can be seen in the complete 
lack of global commentary on the role of Yuan’s Japanese legal adviser at the 
time, professor of international law at Waseda University, Ariga Nagao.  
Nagao, like Goodnow, was an eminent legal scholar in Japan, continuing the 
long tradition of international law professors coming from Japan to China as 
legal advisers.  Furthermore, Nagao was Japan’s leading colonial theorist and 
his work on behalf of Japan was understood within a very different national 
discourse on China.265  Thus, like Goodnow, Nagao felt that a republic was 
inappropriate for China and he worked with Goodnow throughout the 
monarchist affair.  Yet, few ever questioned Nagao’s role in the affair and his 
recommendations generated little backlash in Japan or elsewhere.266 
Woodrow Wilson professed great faith in Yuan Shikai, much as 
Goodnow did, and shared Goodnow’s belief in the need for the tutelage of the 
United States to gradually educate the Chinese masses.267  But if U.S. 
influence turned China from republicanism to monarchism, it would be a 
murkier claim for men like Wilson to believe that this was a movement 
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towards Americanization.  True, Goodnow still held fast to a general faith in 
evolutionary progress, but he held a much longer-term view than the 
emerging U.S. vision of a globe fully democratized in a few decades.  
Notably, Goodnow never actually made any connection between Christianity 
and his general study of law, much less his specific mission to China.268 
Goodnow’s aversion to the incorporation of religion in his work is 
exactly why he was lionized in an unpublished paper by Japan scholar 
Kenneth Pyle, written in 1960 when Pyle was in the early stages of his 
doctoral studies.269  Pyle portrayed Goodnow as a realistic bulwark against 
unbridled U.S. idealism:  “In America the advent of Republicanism in China 
was greeted by an outpouring of naïve and self-righteous enthusiasm.”270  
Pyle locates the negative reaction to Goodnow in the intertwining of 
Christianity and democracy in the American consciousness of the era, noting 
that “many believed that the prospects for diffusion of the Gospel in China 
have been greatly enhanced by the advent of the Republic.”271  Pyle valorized 
Goodnow’s commitment to science, which undermined the “proselytizing zeal 
which sought to bring the democratic and Christian values of American 
civilization to China.”272 
Nevertheless, the fallout at the time from Yuan’s bid for emperor 
became that Goodnow was removed from Chinese affairs and international 
affairs more broadly.  Yet, he retained some lingering personal ties to the 
foreign policy establishment.  He helped arrange for Westel Willoughby to 
succeed him as legal adviser to Yuan in 1915, and, notably, Willoughby did 
consult Goodnow after Willoughby’s own resignation for another 
replacement.273  Goodnow even maintained his family ties to China as his 
daughter married John V. A. MacMurray, who later would serve as Minister to 
China and as the first Director of the Page School at JHU.  There is also some 
evidence that he maintained correspondence with at least one prominent 
Chinese family.  Moreover, for years Goodnow would pepper his speeches at 
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JHU with references to the humanistic Chinese educational tradition, though 
primarily again as stark relief to the pragmatism of JHU.  
It is impossible to ignore the stark contrast between Goodnow’s status 
within the larger political and intellectual foreign policy establishment before 
and after his term as legal adviser in China.  First, Goodnow’s work on 
colonial administration was never published and his participation in the early 
phase of Progressive Era foreign policy has been all but forgotten.  In large 
part, Goodnow’s academic production nearly ceased in toto when he became 
president of JHU.  Although such a high-profile administrative position 
certainly could have preoccupied him, it seems unlikely that he would simply 
put aside a nearly complete manuscript and a sustained fifteen-year interest 
from sheer distraction.  He gave a series of lectures in 1917 on his experience 
in China; however, it was a decade before these lectures were published.274 
Goodnow published two books in the two years after his return, but 
neither of them focused on China or international affairs.275  Only one was 
comparative in nature; Principles of Constitutional Government was simply a 
collection of the lectures he had presented in 1913 at Beijing University.276  
The text makes clear that in China Goodnow did not present U.S. law, but 
instead his own views of global comparative constitutionalism, expanded only 
by the inclusion of South African examples and an approving aside on 
Japanese modernization.277  He included his trademark critique of the 
“religious creed” of the rule of law and judicial independence in the United 
States,278 of the persistence of federalism,279 and then took swipes at natural 
law and social contract theory before declaring to his Chinese audience that 
“[t]he American conception is in a way an obstacle to progressive 
development.”280  Goodnow mentioned China in the lectures only twice, and 
even then only in a relativistic nod to the fact that “the wonderful civilization 
which has developed in China is in no small degree due to the fact that there 
has existed in the China of the past one great state” and a brief comparison of 
                                           
274
  FRANK J. GOODNOW, CHINA: AN ANALYSIS (1926). 
275
 See FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT vii-viii 
(1916). 
276
 FRANK J. GOODNOW, PRINICPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1916). 
277
 “The fact that the Japanese constitution has been practically unamended during the last 27 years of 
its life is a tribute both to the ability of those who drafted it and to the political genius of the people who are 
governed by it.”  Kenneth Pyle, Professor Goodnow and the Chinese Republic, Jan. 19, 1960.  GOODNOW 
PAPERS, supra note 14.  
278
 GOODNOW, supra note 276, at 225. 
279
 Id. at 231 (arguing that “[federalism’s] disadvantages are becoming every day more pronounced as 
the social and economic conditions of the country have been becoming more centralized, but as yet no 
method has been devised for remedying the evil”).   
280
  Id. at 269. 
JUNE 2012 FRANK GOODNOW AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 579 
  
the Chinese Revolution, not in popular fashion to the American Revolution, 
but to the Civil War.281 
Goodnow’s only other publication for the next decade was an article in 
the Columbia Law Review on the League of Nations.282  Interestingly, this 
article shows that he was clearly dubious of the capacity of international legal 
institutions to achieve peace:  “[internationalists] will still cling to the ideals 
of the Roman Empire with its universal peace.  They will at the same time 
forget that that Empire was the result of conquest.”283  This critique has to be 
considered with some irony in light of Goodnow’s relationship with the 
Carnegie Endowment, an organization that predicated its work on the 
establishment of peace through international law.284  
Another indicator of Goodnow’s isolation from the foreign-policy 
establishment is that during these years he made few, if any, new contacts in 
foreign affairs.  Furthermore, he was not invited to join any additional 
institutional aspects of international Progressivism.  He did continue to serve 
on the China Medical Board, but this was likely due to JHU’s prominence as a 
medical research center. 
More direct evidence of this isolation comes from his personal 
correspondence, which reveals that several individuals tried to contact 
Goodnow privately about his China experience and were roundly rebuffed.  
An aspiring legal adviser to China asked Goodnow if he had any copies of his 
Memorandum.  Goodnow claimed to have none.285  A lawyer-missionary of 
the era, Thomas Rambaut, asked Goodnow for a copy of the Chinese 
Constitution, which he believed Goodnow wrote.286  Goodnow again said that 
he had no copies and clearly stated that he was not involved in the writing of 
the document.287  Even when his colleague William Shepherd was writing a 
defensive review of Weale’s book, which was critical of Goodnow, Goodnow 
claimed that he could not find his Memo or any document related to his time 
in China—nor should Shepherd expect to find it elsewhere.288 
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There is evidence that Goodnow attempted to defend his actions in 
China to other established foreign policy elites, though with little success.  
While still in China, he had tried to persuade George Morrison of his good 
intentions, but Morrison knew of Goodnow’s private views and found them 
transparent and “most explicit.”289  Joseph Clarke, a former Irish Nationalist 
turned Rockefeller Foundation man in Asia, recounted how even though 
Clarke found Goodnow quite agreeable personally, Goodnow had also tried 
unsuccessfully to convince Far Eastern expatriates that Yuan’s ambitions were 
ultimately democratic.290  Goodnow even tried to absolve himself when 
corresponding with Reinsch much later in 1921, claiming not Yuan’s good 
intentions but Goodnow’s own impotence.291 
Eventually, Goodnow shifted his focus to his duties at JHU where he 
became widely known for his attempt to remodel U.S. general undergraduate 
education based on European models.  After his retirement in 1929, he 
resumed many of the activities he had undertaken during the first decade of 
the twentieth century, such as lecturing on administrative law and 
participating in public affairs, but solely on the state and municipal level in 
Maryland.292 
Goodnow would briefly return to the arena of Chinese affairs near the 
end of his term as President of JHU.  Ten years after he presented his last 
public lectures on China, they were reprinted in 1927 in a volume entitled 
China: An Analysis.  Strangely, the book is rife with natural science 
references and reads more like an extended National Geographic article than 
a treatise written by a once renowned comparative lawyer.293  When he did 
mention law, he simply stated that the traditional Chinese legal system “for 
centuries has not been a good one.”294  Notably, he mentioned Yuan’s regime 
only in passing, describing the reversion to monarchy as “natural” given 
ineluctable social forces.295 
Reviews of the book were primarily positive.296  Stanford professor and 
East Asian diplomatic historian Payson Treat, who himself had written on 
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Chinese constitutional development prior to Goodnow’s trip, wrote a review 
that, notwithstanding the non-legal focus of China, was published in an 
international law journal.  Treat called the book a trove of accurate 
generalizations written “with, on the whole, striking success.”297   
A. E. Zucker, a leading scholar of Chinese theatre, praised the book and 
claimed that China should once again listen to Goodnow’s advice.298  Fellow 
political scientist Harold Quigley judged the book as a thorough primer on 
Chinese life, although he mentioned the curious omission of Goodnow’s own 
experience.299 
For a brief time after the publication of China, Goodnow started 
receiving a few China-related invitations.  In 1928, Secretary of State Frank 
Kellogg invited him to again become a delegate to the Permanent 
International Commission between China and America, an invitation 
Goodnow quickly accepted.300  Walter Mallory, then Executive Director, 
asked him to give a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations on the 
GMD.301  Interestingly, Goodnow actually resisted the invitation, worried that 
his presence would upset the GMD representatives who would be present.302 
It is possible that some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment had 
actually come to soften their views of Goodnow after the GMD had spent a 
decade struggling to unify China after Yuan’s regime collapsed.  At the outset 
of the decade there was also a decline in U.S. enthusiasm for the Guomindang 
in light of the growing Soviet influence within the Party.  In the 1920s, one 
member of the Far Eastern American Bar Association even spoke highly of 
Goodnow in retrospect, saying that he was not a propagandist for Yuan but 
had spoken honestly to the recalcitrant Chinese.303  The only hint of the 
relevance of China’s fortunes on Goodnow’s temporary rehabilitation is a 
negative one.  In 1928, after Chiang Kaishek led the GMD’s Northern 
Expedition to successfully unify urban China, Goodnow once again 
disappeared from China-related public affairs. 
It would be many years before anyone would mention Goodnow’s 
China mission other than briefly.304  When he died in 1939, he was lionized 
for the success of his presidency at JHU and for his early role in the 
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development of administrative legal science.  His time in China was 
mentioned tersely in his obituaries, save Nicholas Butler’s quote in the New 
York Times that “[i]t isn’t every day that a man is called to help mold a 
nation.”305  Most subsequent histories of the era noted the “Goodnow Memo” 
in the traditional fashion, and one of the few pre-1949 studies of GMD law 
mistakenly cited Goodnow as having attempted to bring Chinese law in line 
with Anglo-American tradition.306 
 Coupled with the initial diversity of reactions to his memo, Goodnow’s 
blacklisting reveals the shifting shape of U.S. legal internationalism in this 
era.  While some still shared the same colonial assumptions upon which 
Goodnow had begun his career, and believed that reformism was a poor 
substitute for the direct transplantation of U.S. legal institutions abroad, others 
were hesitant about the need for U.S. intervention abroad, especially after the 
tragedy of World War I.307  Herein Goodnow was clearly a transitional figure.  
He believed in the ability of a depoliticized legal expertise to shape 
development abroad, but he had not fully adopted the Americanizing 
presumption in which Wilson and others believed.  While America would 
become increasingly involved in Chinese affairs in the following decades, 
Goodnow’s allegiance to comparative legal science would be uniformly 
absent from the work of those who embraced the Americanizing line.308 
 
C. The Inevitable Pitfalls of Eliding Politics Abroad 
With every passing decade, Goodnow’s scholarly and popular 
reputation declined.  Ultimately, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”) in 1949 shifted Sino-U.S. relations away from decades of ever 
increasing idealism about China’s potential Americanization.309 The 
atmosphere in the United States after 1949 became one of recrimination and 
blame as China turned from emulator to enemy.  Chinese studies, subjected 
for many years to political witch-hunts during the McCarthy era,310 emerged 
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from 1949 set on explaining why the United States had “lost” China.311  
Native historians were joined in this analysis by a flow of expatriate Chinese 
intellectuals who had fled the mainland.  Whatever absolution Goodnow’s 
reputation had earned in the prior decades quickly faded, and he, once again, 
became an easy target for recrimination. 
In his 1961 biography of Yuan, Chinese expatriate historian Jerome 
Chen repeated the trope that Goodnow was simply a well-intentioned but 
naïve interlocutor.312  Chen gave credit to Goodnow for reminding Yuan of the 
eventual necessity of establishing “something in the nature of a representative 
parliament.”313  He recognized that Goodnow was chosen as an adviser for 
China because of his then-eminent stature but “Goodnow, like so many U.S. 
reformers, expected too much from militarists and warlords, who did not 
understand or respect individual rights and constitutional government.”314  
Another biographer of Yuan in the 1970s, Ernest Young, cast Goodnow not as 
naïve but as rigid and unyielding in his thinking.315  Young was also critical of 
the fact that Goodnow did not resign immediately when Yuan cracked down 
on the GMD.316 
Of all the accounts of Goodnow’s mission, Noel Pugach’s presents 
itself as the most even-handed.  Pugach casts Goodnow as yet another 
example of a misbegotten Westerner mucking about in the mess of Chinese 
domestic affairs.317  At the same time, Pugach was sympathetic to Goodnow’s 
claim that he was misquoted and manipulated by Chinese officials318 and 
noted that Goodnow persuaded the Peace Planning Society to make a public 
statement that he did not support them—though only in the Chinese press.319  
Historians would also differ in their assessments of the impact of the 
Goodnow Memo.320  While James Sheridan’s classic diagnosis of Chinese 
Republican-era politics gave Goodnow’s influence little weight,321 in sharp 
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contrast, Xu Guoqi’s 2005 history of China’s role in World War I attributes 
catalytic responsibility to Goodnow for Yuan’s turn to monarchy.322  
Goodnow’s full fall from grace can be seen in a 1995 law review article that 
describes him as simply “a middle-aged American law professor” who had 
“stoked and garbed with quasi-legitimacy” the ambitions of the 
“megalomaniacal” Yuan Shikai.323 
For strikingly similar reasons, mention of Goodnow in Chinese 
discourse today is equally dismissive, if not outright hostile.  A China Daily 
article in 1998 repeated the CCP line that characterized Yuan as a victim of 
the imperialist American.324  Yet, in the growing diversity of contemporary 
Chinese academic discourse, one can find a range of disagreement about the 
significance of Goodnow’s role in the era.325 
Judging Goodnow as an individual personality, however, misses 
entirely how novel his role as foreign legal reformer was in U.S. circles.326  
Goodnow was in fact distinctive as the first U.S. practitioner of modern legal 
science to arrive in China with the belief that he had the capacity to directly 
influence Chinese political development, and do so in a private manner 
wholly apart from any official governmental sanction.  Thus, Goodnow’s 
tenure in China was the first major modern test of the non-colonial 
articulation of Americanization abroad through law, and, significantly, by an 
ostensibly private actor.  Far removed from the lofty controversies of the 
Insular Cases, here was Goodnow, a single man thousands of miles from 
America, carrying the collective belief that U.S. legal expertise could be 
transformative without any form of coercion. 
Goodnow’s belief in technocratic legal expertise differed from those 
whom his memo disappointed only in its comparative coherence.  While 
Wilson and others rejected the nature of Goodnow’s conclusions, they all 
agreed that China was a place to, in Young’s words, “test theories and offer 
the special wisdom of Western social science.”327  Despite his own 
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frustrations over his tenure in China, Goodnow never seemed to contemplate 
that he could not apply his preexisting expertise to China; moreover, his 
critics never challenged him on methodical grounds.  His greatest struggle 
arose when no one in Chinese politics took his expertise seriously.  His 
comparative cosmopolitanism had its virtues, but its methodological 
universality was simply not compatible with the parochialism of his 
sponsors.328 
Goodnow’s story, then, highlights exactly how this strange alchemy of 
legal science and parochialism would contribute to the eventual decline of 
comparative law in U.S. legal and political discourse.  One cannot employ a 
rigorous comparative legal science informed by the full range of global 
empirical sources that recursively leads to the conclusion that the legal system 
of a particular nation is universally functional, much less normatively 
desirable.  It is impossible to reconcile such divergent commitments unless 
one presumes as a self-evident fact that the system to be universalized is 
always at the evolutionary vanguard—an empirical presumption that renders 
null the necessity of a truly scientific analysis to begin with.  Nevertheless, it 
was just such an evolutionary presumption that undergirded the notion that 
U.S. foreign legal reform should always be Americanizing.  Ultimately, there 
is essentially no new comparative legal knowledge when every legal culture is 
headed in a predetermined direction that remains consistently defined by a 
single legal culture’s experience. 
Yet, while Goodnow’s allegiance to legal science saved him from the 
contradictions of exporting U.S. law as a scientific process, the 
cosmopolitanism of his comparative constitutional methodology did not save 
him because of his current belief in the depoliticized production of scientific 
knowledge.  Goodnow was seduced by the allure of foreign reform held as an 
arena of depoliticized expert knowledge.329  It made no difference that 
Goodnow did not believe himself to be an agent of U.S. republicanism, as this 
only contributed to his ultimate belief that he was a culturally neutral agent 
who could transform a foreign nation through the application of his personal 
expertise and good intentions. 
It was exactly this presumption of technocratic neutrality that was the 
foundational component of Goodnow’s own failure.  He did not fail because 
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of the character of his intentions or the relative sophistication of his expertise.  
It was his own self-confidence and the ends to which he defended his actions 
and Yuan that made his actual impact on Chinese constitutionalism 
meaningless.  Thus, he can be rightly criticized for the stark public/private 
split in his writings, the self-serving and one-sided use of China to support his 
broader intellectual agenda, and that his experience abroad compelled him to 
undertake little personal or intellectual re-evaluation. 
This depoliticized concept was all the more significant as the 
controversy about Goodnow’s support of Yuan and his recommendation of 
constitutional monarchy was never, in fact, about his expertise, but about his 
politics.  He had even been warned by his friend Charles Bigelow that he 
should be wary of this faith in depoliticized legal expertise prior to his trip to 
China, noting that “that an illiberal and reactionary government cannot 
dispense with a constitutional adviser any more than the large corporations 
here who intend to disregard the law start out without the best lawyer of the 
land in their cabinet.”330  In the end, Goodnow’s skill and commitment as a 
comparativist could not save him from his faith in his ability to separate 
knowledge from power and this led him to run afoul of politics on both sides 
of the Pacific. 
The power of this faith is shown in that Goodnow himself had decades 
earlier made a strong argument for the professionalization and standardization 
of the Foreign Service.  He argued that people posted abroad should have a 
strong particular knowledge of the politics of their host country.331  In his own 
writings on educational reform in China, he noted that his curriculum for 
public administration should be suffused with local knowledge, as “the 
official can be successful in the circumstances of China only with the 
evaluation that he is in touch with the life of the people with whom he has to 
work.”332  Even more striking is that he repeated in many of his writings his 
fear that Chinese educated abroad would become denationalized and out of 
touch with Chinese concerns.  But like so many other technocrats to follow, 
he did little to actually learn about Chinese affairs outside of his very narrow 
Beijing environment.333  For all his later study of Chinese topics, he was 
always far removed from learning about the most important aspect of Chinese 
society for any legal reformer:  Chinese politics.  He lacked insight into or 
any critical understanding of Chinese politics and so committed the cardinal 
sin of failing to consider its actors as capable, calculating agents. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Upon final review, Goodnow’s tenure in China tells us little about 
China during this era, except that many in China cared little for U.S. 
pretensions even if they made use of them in international politics.  
Goodnow’s failure did little to disturb such pretensions, as the actual fate of 
Chinese Republicanism was of far less material importance to U.S. foreign 
affairs than the symbolic affirmation of the United States’ presumed new role 
in legal reform abroad. 
Comparativists like Goodnow led the U.S. legal community to 
increasingly view foreign law as a site of applied rather than critical inquiry.  
There was little place for voices coming from China itself that could raise 
new or novel questions about U.S. constitutionalism.  With some irony, there 
was ultimately no place for Goodnow’s voice either, as his place in history 
became defined by the fact that he did not fully follow the soon to be well-
hewn script of Americanization that would become the basis for foreign legal 
reform work. 
His time in China did not have any significant impact on Sino-U.S. 
relations after Yuan’s fall, and in time the other U.S. advisers who followed 
Goodnow would work not to disturb the agendas and assumptions of the 
sponsors that praised their work.334  In fact, no U.S. legal adviser’s failure in 
China would ever be seen as necessitating a revision of the vision of U.S. law 
he or she sought to export, and this would in later decades become true for 
U.S. lawyers all across the globe.335 
By matter of contrast, consider the critique of Goodnow presented by 
Sudhindra Bose after Goodnow’s 1915 address to APSA.  Bose was an 
Indian-born political scientist who was an ardent promoter of democracy, both 
as an anti-fascist and anti-communist, yet also a critic of Europe and the 
United States’ disruptive, if well-intentioned, impact on Asia.  Consequently, 
Bose found in Goodnow’s speech the curious but characteristic tension of 
describing Asian societies on one hand as inscrutable—“Occidental people 
find no end of difficulty in understanding and interpreting our Oriental laws, 
customs, and institutions”—while on the other hand presenting a confident, 
historically short-sighted judgment on Asian societies as definitely passive.336 
Bose pointed out that Goodnow was attempting to reform China without a 
self-critical position that recognized the internal turmoil still present in the 
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United States itself during the era, or the relatively young age of the U.S. 
republic.337 
Bose’s ultimate critique of Goodnow struck precisely at the 
Americanizing presumption:  “We in the East ask only one thing of the West.  
It is this—that you of the West stay away from us and our problems: leave us 
to solve our own problems, to work out our own destinies, while you spend 
your time looking after yours.  The greatest good you can do us, the lasting 
benefit you can confer on us, is to let us alone.”338  Bose clearly identified the 
shared paternalistic and evolutionary presumptions of European colonialism 
and the new forms of presumptively acolonial U.S. legal reform work.  
Goodnow’s early view of his work as part and parcel of an U.S. colonial 
administration reflects how many of the theoretical and empirical assumptions 
about foreign legal systems did not in fact change even as U.S. foreign legal 
reformers asserted their respect for local sovereignty. 
Goodnow’s failure thus brings to the forefront the core question of what 
exactly the aims of comparative constitutionalism, or any form of 
comparative law, should be.339  Goodnow himself traded comparativism as a 
mechanism for stimulating domestic legal reform for an externally-oriented 
process meant to stimulate foreign legal reform.340  Goodnow’s story exposes 
how such foreign reform work was premised on a one-way export of 
knowledge that in large part removed U.S. law from international legal 
exchange.  Even for Goodnow’s Chinese interlocutors, he did little to enhance 
their understanding of the quite-contested and lively debates about 
constitutionalism alive in U.S. law during this era, but instead left them with 
failed idealizations and bitterness.341 
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 As we consider the lessons that Goodnow’s story holds for 
contemporary concerns, this marginalization of comparative law in domestic 
debates seems far more problematic today as we face a global world of ever 
increasing challenges that is a far cry from the rapid expansion of U.S. 
influence in the early twentieth century. 
While some may seek to dismiss Goodnow as unusually naïve or 
hubristic, it is important to remember that he was not only a singularly 
brilliant scholar, but also perhaps the most outstanding comparative lawyer of 
his generation.  As comparative constitutionalism once again becomes an 
increasingly popular subject of debate in U.S. law, we would do well to reflect 
upon the lessons implicit and explicit in Goodnow’s story.  Especially 
relevant in an age of increasing globalization and new and emergent 
constitutional regimes, Goodnow’s actual tenure as adviser also demonstrates 
how confidence in comparative legal science and depoliticized expertise can 
often exacerbate the impact of local politics rather than bypass them.  We 
should be wary of an overly fervent commitment to legal science that 
conceives of comparative constitutionalism as solely an applied field of 
reform abroad.342 
Further, the need to project U.S. foreign reform work as successful for 
domestic audiences and sponsors presses reformers to misrepresent, with 
well-intentioned but warping optimism, the actual shape of foreign legal 
developments.343  The highly symbolic stature of constitutionalism makes it 
especially ripe for the often only merely self-gratifying invocation of broad 
allusions and sweeping symbolic formalism. 
Thus, we need to pay critical attention to three claims that still have 
seductive allure in today’s debates about comparative constitutionalism.  First, 
that there are “universal” principles to which all modern constitutions should 
adhere.344  Second, that textual analysis of constitutional provisions is 
sufficient for any analysis of a concrete system of constitutional practice.345  
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Third, and most generally, we should be wary of our own exuberance and our 
proclaimed expertise in assessing foreign constitutional needs.346 
Moreover, although the historic influence of the U.S. Constitution 
abroad is well-documented, we need to recognize that much of its influence 
has been felt indirectly through emulation and dialogue, not imposition and 
outright advocacy.347  This point is even more pressing as we face a world 
where our own Constitution and constitutional debates are rapidly waning.348  
At a time when our own constitutional politics is as rancorous as ever, we 
should remember that simple assertion of constitutional exceptionalism is a 
poor substitute for exemplification of good, and perhaps again innovative, 
constitutional practice. 
Recovering Goodnow’s story is but one chapter in a grander narrative 
that describes an era of U.S. involvement in foreign constitution writing.  
Notably, this is a narrative that has been understudied, even forgotten, or, 
much worse, mythologized.349  In sum, as much as anyone may disagree with 
Goodnow’s own view on constitutionalism, if we seek to recapture the vibrant 
cosmopolitanism with which a younger Goodnow sought to energize U.S. 
law, then we would do well to weigh this era and his own history against the 
ever-seductive allure of shaping others instead of reshaping ourselves.350 
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